Florida Law Review
Volume 27

Issue 2

Article 5

January 1975

Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 7421(a), The AntiInjunction Act: Judicial Muzzle makes for Service Muscle
Richard Candelora
John W. Hawkes

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Candelora and John W. Hawkes, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 7421(a), The AntiInjunction Act: Judicial Muzzle makes for Service Muscle, 27 Fla. L. Rev. 414 (1975).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Candelora and Hawkes: Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 7421(a), The Anti-Injuncti
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

rent vitality of the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine in situations where the parent
fails to comply with the express statutory requirements. In one of the few
reported cases that has directly confronted this "prime issue," the Court of
Claims in American Potash & Chemical Corp. held that the judicial doctrine
was not preempted by the enactment of section 334(b)(2). According to this
view, the Kimbell-Diamond rule represents an alternative to the statute for
attaining a cost basis in assets received on liquidation. Other courts, however,
have reached the opposite conclusion. s 3 In view of the resulting uncertainty, a
parent corporation should employ competent tax counsel at the outset. In this
way the acquisition-liquidation transaction can be arranged to yield desired
results without resort to the Kimbell-Diamond rule and almost certain litigation.
Madison Square Garden Corp. illustrates another current problem in basis
determination under section 334(b)(2). In that case the Tax Court denied the
parent corporation a stepped-up basis in the liquidated assets attributable
to the minority interest. Although the Second Circuit reversed this part of
the decision, the case imports a sense of caution to tax practitioners in this
unsettled area.
THEODORE

A.

ERCK, III

INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, SECTION 7421(a), THE
ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT: JUDICIAL MUZZLE MAKES FOR
SERVICE MUSCLE
There is one difference between a tax collector and a taxidermistthe taxidermist leaves the hide.
-Mortimer Caplan, former Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Essential to the effective functioning of any government is the generation
and protection of revenue. The disparate components of American society,
however, have frequently compelled federal legislators to recognize other,
sometimes competing, goals. Through an integrated Internal Revenue Code,
Congress has attempted to harmonize these divergent objectives.
In addition to the familiar graduated tax on income, the Code embraces
other revenue generating measures. Among these is the Wagering Excise
Tax,1 which places a flat ten per cent assessment on wagers. Representative
183. See note 159 supra.
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §4401, reads in pertinent Part: "(a) Wagers.-There shall
be imposed on wagers . . . an excise tax equal to 10 per cent of the amount thereof ....
(c) Persons liable for tax.-Each person who is engaged in the business of accepting
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of revenue-protecting measures are section 7421(a), 2 the "Anti-Injunction"
Act, and the Jeopardy Assessment provisions.3 Section 7421 (a) effectively
forestalls most pre-assessment and pre-collection litigation by prohibiting
suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes. The
Jeopardy Assessment procedures allow immediate demand for payment where
assessment or collection is imperiled by delay. But not all provisions of the
Code are directed toward the generation or protection of revenue. Exemptions
from the tax laws have been used to encourage the development and growth
4
of a diversified social order. Illustrative of such provisions is section 501,
which grants preferred tax status to organizations whose purposes and operations satisfy its guidelines for socially desirable activities.
The Code is, of course, not self-executing, and this characteristic has permitted the Internal Revenue Service to employ Code provisions to effectuate
its own objectives, thereby causing an imbalance in the political structure.
For example, in the Wagering Tax and Jeopardy Assessment areas, Service
zeal in constraining "undesirable" conduct such as gambling and drug-related
activities has occasionally led to arbitrary assessments and other forms of
harassment. Such acts, which often permit the Service to impose "administrative" sanctions where criminal prosecution is not sustainable, are unrelated
to the congressional policies of revenue generation or protection.
Similar problems have occurred in the section 501(c)(3) area. Increased
social awareness, with its resultant challenges to traditional concepts of
charitable organizations, has proven the wisdom of adopting flexible definitional criteria for exempt organizations. But the effect of this approach
has been to repose in the Service the authority to define the parameters of
permissible activities, and this power has not been ignored. It has been
used to impose the Service's interpretation of proper social policy and, more
alarmingly, to achieve politically motivated objectives such as nullification
of opposing views.
Within the familiar system of corrective justice, such abuses would not go
unchecked. The aggrieved party could seek redress of preliminary administrative decisions in the courts. But through adept use of the protective shield
of section 7421(a) in these areas, the Service has largely precluded judicial
review. The result is that distorted administrative interpretations of congressional policy attain a privileged status similar to res judicata.
This note analyzes the applications of section 7421(a) in the three previously mentioned areas and attempts to delineate the power available to the
wagers . . . [or] who conducts any wagering pool or lottery shall be liable for and shall
pay the tax under this subchapter ......
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7421(a) provides in part: "Except as provided in section
6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), and 7426(a) and (b)(1), no suit for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person...."
3. INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§6861-64. These sectiohs provide for immediate assessment if collection will be jeopardized by delay, as well as procedural provisions for implementation.
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§501(a), (c)(3).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss2/5

2

Candelora and Hawkes: Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 7421(a), The Anti-Injuncti
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

Service under present judicial interpretations of the statute's scope. An
evaluation of the present state of the law is undertaken, and corrective
measures are suggested.
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF SECTION
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF

7421 (a)
1954

OF THE

Traditionally, courts of equity were unwilling to enjoin the assessment
or collection of taxes merely upon a showing that the tax was illegal5 or
the assessment irregular. 6 They required the taxpayer to further establish
that special circumstances made his legal remedy inadequate before an injunction would be issued. 7 Such judicial restraint was deemed necessary because a delay in the collection of revenue could prove detrimental to governmental operations.8
It was against this setting that the precursor of section 7421(a) 9 was
enacted. Although its background is "shrouded in darkness,"' 1 its sweeping
prohibition of all suits "for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax"" appeared to preclude judicial review of the revenue
collection process. Judicial interpretation of this statute, however, belies
5. See, e.g., Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 547 (1873). See generally
Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes Despite Statutory Prohibition, 49 HARV. L. REV. 109 n.6 (1935).

6.

See, e.g., Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108 (1870); Note, supra note

5, at 109 n.7.

7. A clear showing of equitable jurisdiction was necessary. As stated in Magee v.
Denton, 16 F. Cas. 382 (No. 8943), 2 A.F.T.R. 2065, 2066 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1863): "If this
[assessment] has not been made in such form and mode as to give the legal right to levy
and collect the tax therefor, that objection must be urged in a court of law and not in a
court of equity." Special circumstances sufficient to invoke equity jurisdiction were found
where irreparable harm or a multiplicity of lawsuits would result if the requested relief
were denied. Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108, 110 (1870).
8. Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108, 110 (1870).
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §7421(a) was first enacted as Revenue Act of 1867 ch. 169,
§10, 14 Stat. 475, as amended, REV. STAT. §3224 (1875). Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §3653
and the current provision are similar to the earlier codification except for the redetermination exceptions by right to petition the Tax Court. Section 7421(a) provides: "Except as
provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), and 7426(a) and (b)(1), no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any
court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom the tax was
assessed." The word "any" before "tax" was added to the revised statutes version, REV.
STAT. §3224 (1875). The phrase beginning "by any person" was added by §110(c) of the
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1126, 1144. For a
discussion of the purpose of this addition, see Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 94 S. Ct. 2038,
2043, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9438, at 84,067 n.6 (1974). For a thorough discussion of the history
and purpose of this Act, see Corovitz, Federal Tax Injunctions and the Standard Nut
Cases, 10 TAxEs 446 (1932); Note, supra note 5. For consistency, the provision is cited as
§7421(a) (or as the Anti-Injunction Act) throughout the text. See generally 9 J. MElTENs,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§49.210-.216

(1971). As explained in Note, supra

note 5, at 109 n.9, there is almost no published legislative history on the Act.
10. Note, supra note 5, at 109 n.9.
11.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §7421(a).
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its uncompromising language. 12 The history of its application is replete with
3
factual circumvention, the boundaries of which have changed over time.1
For about sixty years the tendency of the courts was to deny injunctive
relief. 4 The one case 5 on which the Supreme Court seemingly relied 0 to
establish a permissive standard was speedily and severely restricted. 7 But in
1982 the Court's decision in Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co.38 opened
the door for lower courts to broaden the exceptions to the operational bar
of section 7421(a). Despite precedent holding that an identical product was
not taxable"9 under the Oleomargarine Tax Act, 20 the Service threatened to
12. See Pullan v. Kinsinger, 20 F. Cas. 44, 48 (No. 11,463) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1870),
where the court states: "[The statute [now §7421(a)] prohibiting an injunction in this
case was wholly unnecessary, enacted only as a politic and kindly publication of an old
and familiar rule...."
13. See, e.g., Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 1962-2 U.S.T.C.
9545 (1962); Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 3 U.S.T.C. 878 (1932).
These cases are discussed in thd text accompanying notes 18-34 infra.
...
14. Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922); Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118, 1 U.S.T.C.
16 (1916); State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 2 A.F.T.R. 2367 (1876) (analogous treatment
of a state tax). The assessment should, however, be made "under color . . . of office." See
Synder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189, 193, 3 A.F.T.R. 2460, 2463 (1883). Nor was allegation of
an unjust assessment sufficient to avoid the bar imposed by §3224 [now §7421(a)]. Id. at 194,
3 A.F.T.R. at 2464. The Supreme Court, in Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85, 88, 2
A.F.T.R. 2365, 2366 (1876), discussed the necessity for "stringent measures for the collection of taxes .

. .

. These measures are not judicial; nor does the government resort,

except in extraordinary cases, to the courts for that purpose ....
The United States ...
[has] enacted a system of corrective justice, as well as a system of taxation, in both its
customs and internal-revenue branches. That system is intended to be complete." Notable
exceptions were suits between private parties, Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429 (1895), and situations where the exaction was held to be a penalty rather than a
true tax. See, e.g., Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386, 1922 CCH 2074 (1922);
Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 1 U.S.T.C. 67 (1922); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 1 U.S.T.C.

165 (1922).
15. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 1 U.S.T.C. 65 (1922).
16. Dodge v. Brady, 240 U.S. 122, 126, 1 U.S.T.C. 7, at 1014 (1916) (dictum).
* 17. Graham v. Dupont, 262 U.S. 234, 1 U.S.T.C. 78 (1923). The Court distinguished
the penalty cases cited in note 14 supra on the basis that they were not situations of enjoining taxes, but rather illegal penalties in the nature of punishment for a criminal

offense. Id. at 257, 1 U.S.T.C. 78, at 1203. In discussing Hill v. Wallace, the Court stated:
"Under these [blocking the entire future grain business of the country] extraordinary and
most exceptional circumstances, it was held that section 3224 [now §7421(a)] was not applicable to prevent an injunction against collection of such a prohibitive tax imposed for

the purpose of regulating the future grain business with all the unnecessary and disastrous
consequences its enforcement would entail if the act was unconstitutional. Hill v. Wallace
should, in fact, be classed with Lipke v. Lederer . . . as a penalty in the form of a tax."

Id. at 257-58, 1 U.S.T.C. at 1203-04.
18. 284 U.S. 498, 3 U.S.T.C. 878 (1932).
19. Taxpayer's product had been held not to constitute oleomargarine, and not taxable
as such. Higgins Mfg. Co. v. Page, 297 F. 644 (D.R.I. 1924). A letter from the Collector
of Internal Revenue in answer to inquiry made by the company as to taxability of its
product affirmed its nontaxable status. Additionally, a favorable Treasury decision had
been rendered earlier. T.D. 3590, 1924-1 Cum. BULL. 507 (1924).
20. Oleomargarine Act of 1886, Act of Aug. 2, 1886, ch. 840, 24 Stat. 209, as amended,
Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 786, 32 Stat. 193. The Court specifically distinguished the penalty
situations of Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 1 U.S.T.C. 67 (1922) and Regal Drug Corp.
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make an assessment against respondent. When the company sued for injunctive relief, the Service asserted section 7421(a) as a defense, arguing
that the provision barred an injunction even if the tax had been erroneously
assessed.- Focusing on the arbitrariness of the Service's determination of the
product's taxability,22 the Supreme Court upheld an order granting the injunction.
The nebulous criteria 23 developed by the Court, however, offered little
guidance to lower courts, and when forced to delimit the scope of the Nut
Margarine exception they split drastically.24 Although the Supreme Court
appeared to revive the pre-section 7421(a) requirements in a subsequent
case, 25 it was not until thirty years after Nut Margarine that the controversy
was settled and the current interpretation announced. In Enochs v. Williams
Packing & Navigation Co.,2 6 the taxpayer sued to enjoin the Service from
v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386, CCH 1922 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. 2079 (1922). It is important to
note at the outset that this was not treated as a collection of a penalty, for such an approach brings the case initially within the boundaries of §7421(a).
21. 284 U.S. at 506, 3 U.S.T.C. at 3140.
22. 284 U.S. at 506, 3 U.S.T.C. at 3140. The Court observed that an act in 1930
enlarged the definition to cover products such as Standard Nut Margarine's. However,
under no interpretation could the original act, which was applicable to the taxpayer's
product, include this product containing no animal fat.
23. The Court appeared to be confused as to the precedential value of Hill v. Wallace,
259 U.S. 44, 1 U.S.T.C. 65 (1922), when it cited that case in support of its contention
that "extraordinary and exceptional circumstances render its [§7421(a)] provisions inapplicable." 284 U.S. at 510, 3 U.S.T.C. at 3141. See discussion of Graham v. Dupont, 262
U.S. 234, 1 U.S.T.C. 78 (1922), note 17 supra.
24. Commentators disagree on the exact nature of the divisions. See generally Note,
supra note 5, at 113; Comment, Federal Taxation: Section 7421(a) of Internal Revenue Code
Literally Construed To Ban All Suits To Enjoin Assessment or Collection of Taxes, 1963
DUKE L.J. 175, 178 [hereinafter cited as Section 7421(a) Literally Construed]; Comment,
Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Enjoining Collection, 61 MICH. L. REV. 405, 408 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Enjoining Collection]. But at least two theories, representing endpoints of a continuum, are discernible. At one extreme are the courts that interpreted
the opinion as reviving the pre-§7421(a) requirements for injunctive relief. See, e.g., Lassoff
v. Gray, 266 F.2d 745, 1959-1 U.S.T.C. 15,235 (6th Cir. 1959); Gold Medal Foods, Inc.
v. Landy, 11 F. Supp. 65 (D. Minn. 1935). They premised their conclusion on the Supreme
Court's assertion that the provision was merely declaratory of the common law rule. 284
U.S. at 509, 3 U.S.T.C. at 3141. In other jurisdictions this drastic departure from developing law was rejected. Pointing to the Supreme Court's statement that the "special and
extraordinary circumstances" of Nut Margarine made "the reasons underlying §3224
[now §7421(a)] apply, if at all, with little force." Id. at 510, 3 U.S.T.C. at 3141, these courts
concluded that the decision merely added one more exception to the Anti-Injunction Act's
application. See Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 242 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1957). Such confusion
is understandable because the Nut Margarine Court was rather adept at obfuscating its
position. Only with the aid of hindsight in the analysis of more recent cases do the Nut
Margarine facts appear to fully satisfy the modern requirement for an exception to
§7421(a) discussed in text accompanying notes 39-40 infra. A short dissent in Nut Margarine
asserted that the statute was an absolute bar. 284 U.S. at 511, 3 U.S.T.C. at 3141-42.
25. Allen v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 304 U.S. 439, 1938-2 U.S.T.C. 9321 (1939). The
language of the opinion, however, suggests that the Court treated the imposition of the
tax in this case as a penalty.
26. 370 U.S. 1, 1962-2 U.S.TC. 9545 (1962).
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assessing social security and unemployment taxes.2 7 In rejecting the taxpayer's
contention that the action was governed by Nut Margarine,the Court undertook an analysis of the scope of section 7421(a).28 Pointing to the Tax Injunction Act of 1937,29 which permitted federal injunctions of state tax assessments solely upon a showing of an inadequate legal remedy, the Court
concluded that in order to avoid the more sweeping language of section
7421(a), a taxpayer would have to show more than merely an inadequate
remedy at law. 3° Additionally, he must establish that on the facts of his case
it is impossible for the Service to succeed in its claim:
[I]f it is clear that under no circumstances could the Government
ultimately prevail, the central purpose of the Act is inapplicable
and, under the Nut Margarine case, the attempted collection may be
enjoined if equity jurisdiction otherwise exists.21
Williams Packing thus established that a judicial exception to section
7421(a) would be made only where two elements existed: (1) Under the
most liberal view of the law and the facts the government could not ultimately
prevail, 2 and (2) equity jurisdiction otherwise exists. 3 Because these criteria
27. The corporate taxpayer provided fishing boats to captains who employed their
own crews. The Service contended that the members of such crews were employees of
Williams Packing Co. The district court held for the taxpayer and granted an injunction,
finding, inter alia, the lack of the requisite common law element of control, essential
for an employment relationship. 176 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. Miss. 1959), aff'd, 291 F.2d 402,
1962-1 U.S.T.C. 9263 (5th Cir. 1961).
28. The Court pointed out that lower court decisions misinterpreting the thrust
of Nut Margarinehad turned on the absence of an adequate legal remedy. 370 U.S. at 6,
1962-2 US.T.C. at 85,289.
29. Act of Aug. 21, 1937, ch. 726, 50 Stat. 738, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §1341 (1970).
This Act forbids federal courts from entertaining suits to enjoin collection of state taxes
"'where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity in the
courts of such State . . ."

30. 370 U.S. at 6, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,289. The company had alleged that payment
of the assessment would force it into bankruptcy, and thereby cause irreparable injury.
The Court said that while such showing was not sufficient in itself to avoid the §7421(a)
prohibition, proof of inadequate legal remedy was essential. A careful reading of the
opinion suggests that the Court is equating irreparable harm with inadequacy of legal
remedy. But see Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2053, 1974-2 U.S.T.C.
9439 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (analysis of the elements of irreparable harm and
inadequate legal remedy as separate factors); Comment, "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters
and Bob Jones University v. Connally: Revocation of Tax Exempt Status and §7421(a) of the
IRC, 46 TEM,. L.Q. 596, 600 (1973) (commentator derives a 3-pronged test from Witliams Packing,with each of these factors as a separate prong).
31. 370 U.S. at 7, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,289.
32. The Court said: "We believe that the question of whether the Government has
a chance of ultimately prevailing is to be determined on the basis of the information
available to it at the time of the suit. Only if it is then apparent that, under the most
liberal view of the law and the facts, the United States cannot establish its claim, may
the suit for an injunction be maintained." Id. The dissent by Judge Rives in the Fifth
Circuit's opinion contains an analysis that appears to be of firmer logical foundation
that the majority opinion. 291 F.2d 402. 1962-1 U.S.T.C. §9263, at 83,633. He points out
that Nut Margarine was the only case not involving a penalty where the Supreme Court
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were presaged in the Nut Margarine factual situation, Williams Packing appeared to limit the Nut Margarine exception to the facts of that case. 34 By
requiring the taxpayer to prove certainty of success on the merits in order
to satisfy the first prong of the test, the opinion seems to prescribe that section 7421(a) can never be avoided when a factual dispute exists.
In evaluating the import of Williams Packing, it is critical to realize
that the factual dispute involved a taxpayer directly litigating his own tax
liability. Therefore, the Court was not compelled to address the question of
whether the suit was one "for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax." Consequently, the case did not define the applicable
scope of section 7421(a); it merely created a judicial exception for an action
within the ambit of the Act.
JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF SECTION

7421 (a)

SUBSEQUENT TO

Williams Packing
A taxpayer may circumvent the prohibition of section 7421(a) by satisfying
either the statutory or judicially created exceptions. Successful use of the
latter method requires, inter alia, that the taxpayer satisfy the rather stringent
first prong of the Williams Packing test. In determining the range of parameters that permits a taxpayer to neutralize the government's use of section
7421(a), it is necessary to examine the functional utility of both the statutory
exceptions and the Williams Packing exception.
Cases involving a wagering excise tax imposition or use of the jeopardy
assessment procedure represent two areas of extensive section 7421(a) litigation in the years since Williams Packing. Moreover, they demonstrate typical
instances in which the Service might be motivated by interests collateral to
purely revenue protection or generation. In both areas the arbitrary assessments and other questionable tactics indicate the abuse potential of the section 7421(a) injunctive bar.

permitted an injunction. See discussion in 9 J. MERTENS, supra note 9, §49.212. Furthermore,
"the rational of Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Company, supra, cannot be extended
to bring within some supposedly implied exception cases like the present one without
emasculating the prohibition contained in the statute." 291 F.2d at 409, 1962-I U.S.T.C. at
83,634. Realizing that Nut Margarine was not a case of an illegal exaction in the guise
of a tax, Judge Rives recognized the central question of law-question of fact dichotomy
that must be explored in determining jurisdiction. "[T]he question is closely and hotly
litigated purely as a question of fact .... " Id. at 410, 1962-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,635.
33. 370 U.S. at 7, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,289. To establish equitable jurisdiction, the
taxpayer would have to prove that he would suffer irreparable harm for which there
is no adequate remedy at law.
34. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 201-204 infra, Williams Packing can
be read to endorse a purpose-oriented approach to the application of §7421(a). But more
recent Supreme Court opinions have rejected this view and applied the Williams Packing
test so as to effectively preclude judicial relief. That such a possibility existed in situations
where Tax Court relief was not available (lid not go unnoticed by commentators. See, e.g.,
Section 7.121(a) Literally Construed, supra note 24, at 181; Enjoining Collection, supra
note 24, at 409.
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Interaction of the Jeopardy Assessment Proceduresand the
Section 7421(a) Prohibition .
To allow a taxpayer sufficient opportunity to petition -the Tax Court for
a redetermination of a deficiency, section 6212(a) of the Code authorizes a
notice of deficiency to be sent to the taxpayer. 35 Section 6213(a) provides that
no assessment of a deficiency, 3 nor any levy or court proceeding for its collection, may be made until ninety days 37 after mailing of such notice. If a
petition is filed with the Tax Court, there is a further prohibition until a
final decision.38
Section 6213(a) also affords the taxpayer injunctive relief during the
time these prohibitions are in force, thereby constituting -a statutory exception to section 7421(a).39 There are exceptions to thesegeneral rules, 4 0 however, including provisions, covering situations whexe,assessment or. colle.ction
of a deficiency may be jeopardized by delay.41 In such a case section 6861(a)
provides for immediate jeopardy assessment of the deficiency, together with
interest and additional amounts provided for by law, and demand for payment thereof. 42 Since this procedure gives the District Director rather broad
discretionary powers in making the assessment, 43 the. taxpayer's right of
petition to the Tax Court is protected by section 6861(b). Generally, this
provision requires the mailing of a deficiency notice to the taxpayer within

35. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6212(a). The notice of deficiency is, of critical importance
to the taxpayer because it is a jurisdictional prerequisite to litigation in the Tax Court.
See Mason v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 388, 1954-1 U.S.T.C. 19326 (5th Cir. 1954); INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, §6213(a).
36. "An assessment is an administrative determination that a certain amount is currently due and owing as a tax. It makes the-taxpayer a debtor in much the same way
as would a judgment." Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1061, n.1, 1974-1 U.S.T.C.
19242, at 83,453 n.1 (6th Cir. 1974). As to a deficiency, see discussion id. at 1064. 1974-1
U.S.T.C. at 83,455; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§6211, 6861; TREAS. REG.§301.6211-1(a).
37. The statutory period is extended to.180 days if the notice is addressed to a person
outside the United States. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6213(a).
38.
39.

Id.
Id.

40. For a discussion of other restrictions, see 9 J.MERTENS, supra note 9, §§49.138-.143,
.158-.169.
41. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, §§6861-64. Thus, §6213(a) contains an override, providing
for a §6861 assessment.
42. The injunctive bar of §7421(a) is applicable to these jeopardy assessments. See
Milliken v. Gill, 211 F.2d 869, 1954-1 U.S.T.C. 19343 (4th Cir. .1954); 9 J.MEatTENs, supra
note 9, §49.216 n.56. The absence of prior.notice in this procedure has been held to be
constitutional. Harvey v. Early, 66 F. Supp. 761, 1946-2 U.S.T.C. 9344 (W.D. Va. 1946),
af'd, 160 F.2d 836, 1947-1 U.S.T.C. %9229 (4th Cir. 1947). The underlying reason for
the jeopardy assessment procedures was discussed in a case decided by the Seventh Circuit. "Mt is clear that jeopardy assessments are of their nature and purpose arbitrary ....
There is little doubt but what a jeopardy assessment is a statutory label for the sovereign's
stranglehold on a taxpayer's assets." Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 242 F.2d 645, 650-51; 1957-1
U.S.T.C. 19372, at 56,599 (7th Cir. 1957).
43. See 9 J.MmTENs, supra note 9, §49.145- (1971).
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sixty days after the jeopardy assessment, if such assessment is made before
44
the issuance of a section 6212(a) notice of deficiency.
In lieu of a jeopardy assessment, a taxpayer's taxable year may be terminated and demand made for immediate payment under section 6851(a).
This provision may be invoked upon a finding that a taxpayer is about to
leave the United States or "do any other act tending to prejudice or to
render wholly or partly ineffectual proceedings to collect the income
tax .....

,,5There is presently a split of authority46 as to which statutory

provision, section 620147 (the general assessment provision) or section
6861,48 provides assessment authority for this termination procedure. The
significance of this difference is that only section 6861 requires the sending
of a notice of deficiency. Therefore, because receipt of the notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite to litigation in the Tax Court,4 9 a taxpayer is effectively
precluded from that forum if assessment authority is found under section
6201.50
44.
45.

INT. REV. CODE OF

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §6212(a).
1954, §6851(a).

46. The earlier view was that §6851(a) itself contained assessment authority. See Williamson v. United States, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-456 (7th Cir. 1971); Puritan Church-Church of
18,332 (1951), aJ'd per curiam on other grounds, 209
America, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mern.
F.2d 306, 1953-2 U.S.T.C. 9601 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1953); Ludwig-Littauer &: Co., 37 B.T.A. 840 (1938). This theory, which rests on the premise that
§6851 presupposes a more exigent situation of jeopardy than does §6861, was first rejected
in Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 19541 (D. Md. 1969).
While courts since Schreck have been unanimous in their rejection of the earlier view,
their rationales have differed. See notes 47, 48 infra and cases cited therein.
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6201. The Service has argued that termination of
the taxable year under §6851 does not invoke the §6861 60-day notice rule. The basis
for the argument is that there is no deficiency within the meaning of §6211. For cases
accepting this rationale, see Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9423 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 9 CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 70,728; Irving v. Gray, 479
F.2d 20, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 9581 (2d Cir. 1973); Williamson v. United States, 31 A.F.T.R. 2d
73-8456 (7th Cir. 1971).
48. For a good discussion of the history and development of the split in authorities,
see Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 9687 (5th Cir. 1974). Using the
language in the §6211 Regulations, the court concluded that a §6851 liability is a deficiency; §6851 assessment authority flows from §6861; and the procedural safeguards of
§6861, especially the right to petition the Tax Court, are applicable to a §6851 quick
termination. 501 F.2d at 116, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,231. The court's reasoning followed that
of the 6th Circuit in Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9242 (6th
Cir. 1974). Certiorari has been applied for in a later 6th Circuit decision in accord with
Rambo. Hall v. United States, 493 F.2d 1211, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9296 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. granted, 9 CCH STAND. FED. TAx REP. 70,773. District courts in accord include Lisner
v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. %73-2038 (D. Ariz. 1973), appeal docketed,
Nos. 73-2037, 73-2038, 9th Cir., June 8, 1973; Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265,
1969-2 U.S.T.C. 9541 (D. Md. 1969), reaff'd on reconsideration, 375 F. Supp. 742, 1974-1
U.S.T.C. 19295 (D. Md. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1566, 4th Cir., May 16, 1974.
49. See note 35 supra.
50. Under §6201 a taxpayer's only remedy is to pay the entire tax, file a claim for
refund, and, if the claim is denied, bring suit in a federal district court for refund. See, e.g.,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§6511, 6532, 7422. In Hall v. United States, 493 F.2d 1211, 1974-1
U.S.T.C. 9296 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 9 CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 70,773,
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Those courts holding that a notice of deficiency is required for a section
6851(a) taxable year termination could find that failure to issue a notice
pursuant to section 6861(b) results in two forms of relief to the taxpayer. First,
injunctive relief may be provided within the section 6213(a) exception to section 7421(a), as though the usual section 6212(a) notice had not been issued.51
Second, although no court has specifically so held, such a failure seems to
satisfy the first prong of the Williams Packing test 52 for injunctive relief. In
addition to satisfaction of the statutory exception by failure of the Service
to send a notice of deficiency, constitutional violations13 and arbitrary assessments54 have been found sufficient to trigger Williams Packing injunctive
relief despite the prohibition of section 7421(a). The subsequent analysis
focuses upon the various factual situations involving a jeopardy assessment
wherein a taxpayer is able to satisfy the William Packing two-pronged test
or the statutory exception to section 7421(a).
Representative of the split of the courts over assessment authority for a
short year termination are the cases of Irving v. Gray55 and Rambo v. United
States.5 6 The Irving case involved the "Hughes hoax," wherein McGraw-Hill,
Inc. made payments to Clifford Irving in connection with his writing a book

about the wealthy recluse, Howard Hughes. 57 Fearing that delay might
imperil revenue, the Service terminated Irving's taxable year and levied
on his securities accounts. The taxpayer claimed that he was entitled to injunctive relief because the Service had failed to comply with the deficiency
notice requirements of section 6861(b). The Second Circuit disagreed, however, finding that short year assessment authority flowed from section 6201(a),
not section 6861(b).5 The court reached this conclusion by reasoning that a
section 6851 assessment is not a deficiency as defined in section 6211,5 9 and
the 6th Circuit, following its precedent in Rambo, noted that no deficiency notice was given
under §6861(b) after a §6861(a) taxable year termination. The court pointed out that
"[flit is very important to a taxpayer, particularly to one who does not have $52,000, that
she have a right to litigate the validity of the tax before her property is levied upon
and sold to pay the tax." Furthermore, "[the] I.R.S. has prevented plaintiff from availing
herself of the remedy in the Tax Court." Id. at 1212, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,625.
51. See Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 9299 (D. Ariz. 1973),
appeal docketed, Nos. 73-2037, 73-2038, 9th Cir., June 8, 1973.
52. Failure of the Government to comply with the 60-day notice of deficiency requirement would mean that the Government could not possibly prevail in further litigation.
53. See text accompanying notes 95-97 infra.
54. See text accompanying notes 84-94 infra.
55. 479 F.2d 20, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 9581 (2d Cir. 1973).
56. 492 F.2d 1060, 1974-1 U.S.T.C.
9242 (6th Cir. 1974).
57. This was "a scheme by Clifford Irving and Richard Suskind to write and sell
an 'authorized' version of the life of billionaire recluse Howard Hughes, when, in fact
there was no authorization therefor by Hughes." 479 F.2d 20, 21, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 9581,
at 81,857 (2d Cir. 1973).
58. In so doing, it declined to follow Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1969-2
U.S.T.C. 19541 (D. Md. 1969), reaff'd on reconsideration, 375 F. Supp. 742, 1974-1 U.S.T.C.
9285 (D. Md. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1566, 4th Cir., May 16, 1974.
59. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §6211. The court followed, for example, Williamson v.
United States, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-456 (7th Cir. 1971). See also Da Boul v. Commissioner, 429
F.2d 38, 1970-2 U.S.T.C. 9502 (9th Cir. 1970).
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therefore the section 6861(b) deficiency notice requirement did not control.
As a result, the taxpayers were barred from seeking Tax Court relief.60
In contrast to Irving, the Sixth Circuit in Rambo affirmed a summary
judgment subsequent to an injunction,61 ordering the Service to return attached property and to refrain from collecting any tax assessed for the terminated period. In a pattern of events that is becoming increasingly prevalent
in drug-related cases,6 2- taxable year termination and an assessment for income taxes were made following a traffic arrest and a subsequent search of
the taxpayer's car and person. 63 The Rambo court concluded that statutory
authority for the short year assessment was conferred by section 6861(b), and
thus the sixty-day deficiency notice was mandatory.6 4 The court reached its
decision by reasoning that the tax imposed constituted a deficiency within
the meaning of section 6211, and, therefore, the notice requirement of section 6861 was applicable. 65 The holding was buttressed by an examination
of the statute's legislative history, which the court viewed as "a movement
away from the harsh, and often unjust, effects of a code which required the
taxpayer to pay his tax before he could have a judicial hearing on the
amount properly due. ' ' 66 This supported the taxpayer's assertion that the
procedural requirements of sections 6861 and 6863 were meant to apply to
all jeopardy taxpayers, whether assessed at the end of the taxable year or
upon taxable year termination pursuant to section 6851.67
Moreover, the court noted, the sequential arrangement of sections 6851
and 6861 permitted the reasonable inference that Congress intended for
the latter section to provide assessment authority for the former.6 8
A comparison of the reasoning employed in the two opinions demonstrates
the inadequacies of the Irving rationale. In arriving at its conclusion that a
deficiency sufficient to trigger a notice requirement could not exist if the
taxpayer had not filed a return prior to the assessment, the Irving court re60. See note 35 supra.
61. 353 F. Supp. 1021, 1972-1 U.S.T.C. 9244 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
62. See, e.g., Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 9687 (5th Cir. 1974);
Willits v. Richardson, 362 F. Supp. 456, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 19602 (S.D. Fla. 1973), rev'd,
497 F.2d 240, 1974-2 U.S:T.C. 9583 (5th Cir. 1974).
63. The search revealed a supply of drugs and $2,200 in cash. There was no prosecution
on any charge related to this arrest; probation arising from previous charges was, however,
revoked 492 F.2d at 1061, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,453.
64. 492 F.2d at 1065, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,455. The Service took the position that
termination under §6851(a) is not a deficiency within the meaning of §6211. That is,
a §6851(a) termination results in a "provisional statement of the amount which must be
presently paid as a protection against the impossibility of collection." Ludwig-Littauer &
Co., 37 B.T.A. 840, 842 (1938). See also Williamson v. United States, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 173-456
(7th Cir. 1971).
65. "Clearly, the I.R.S. has imposed a tax and just as clearly the taxpayer has denied
that he owes that amount by refusing either to pay the imposed tax or to file a return."
492 F.2d at 1064, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,455.
66. Id.
67. Id. For cases agreeing that §6861 provides the assessment authority for a §6851
quick termination, see cases cited note 48 supra.
68. 492 F.2d at 1064, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 19242, at 83,455. Sections 6851 and 6861 both
appear in ch. 70, subsch. A of the Code under the heading "Jeopardy."
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fused to look beyond the statute itself and the "plain meaning" of its
language."9 The Rambo court, on the other hand, found that the opposite
conclusion was compelled by congressional intent as gleaned from the legislative history and the practical realities of the situation. 70 Similarly, the
Irving court failed to recognize the total effect of a failure to issue a deficiency
notice. It limited its inquiry to the absence of the Tax Court forum, which
it found inconsequential because of the available procedure of filing a full
year return and suing for overpayment in a federal district court. 71 The
Rambo court, however, held that the taxpayer should not be relegated to
a refund suit,7 2 which would deny him the other procedural safeguards
provided in the jeopardy assessment sections. 3 Moreover, the court noted
that permitting the Government to seize and sell property without judicial
consideration of the validity of the tax constituted a potential due process
7
violation. 4
Although the Rambo court recognized the Williams Packing decision, it
declined to decide the case within this judicially-created exception. 75 Rather,
the injunction was sustained because of the Service's failure to send the section 6861 notice. 76 It seems quite clear, however, that the Government could
not prevail because of its failure to send the required notice, and the second
prong of Williams Packing-equity jurisdiction-also existed. 77 While the
Irving court considered the availability of injunctive relief under Williams
Packing,5 it negated the second prong by finding that the taxpayers had an
69. 479 r.2d at 24, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at-81,859.
70.

492 F.2d at 1064, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,455.

71. 479 F.2d at 24, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at 81,859.
72. The only remedy would thus be for the taxpayer to pay the tax, file a. return
at the end of his regular taxable year and sue in district court for a refund. See INT. Rv.
CODE OF 1954, § §6511, 6532i '7422, and Flora -v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 1960-1 U.S.T.C.
9347 (1960).
73. Not only is .the notice a jurisdictional prerequisite to Tax Court litigation, but
"while awaiting the decision of the Tax Court, -the jeopardy taxpayer may stall collection
proceedings if he, is able to post an adequate bond, see 6863(a). If he cannot, the seized
property cannot be sold absent certain limited exigent circumstances; see 6863(b)(3)(A).,
The I.R.S. may abate the jeopardy assessment if it finds that jeopardy does not exist. 'Sec.
6861(g)." 492 F.2d at 1062, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,454.
74. Id. at 1064-65, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,455-56.
75. Id. at 1062 n.2, 1974-*U.S:T.C. at "83,453 n.2.
76. 'See text accompanying notes -61-68 supra.
77.' The Service had levied on Rambo's bank account and several of his automobiles.'
Furthermoie, there was-no adequate legal remedy 'since the taxpayer had no notice bf'
deficiency, barring Tax Court relief. The sufficiency of the lack of notice as a satisfaction
of the first prong has'not been clearly articulated in other lower court opinions following
the Rambo logic as to requirement for the notice. Rather, the courts place their reliance
on the statutory exceptions to §7421(a). See Shaw.v. McKeever,. 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9348 (D.
Ariz. 1974), notice of appeal filed, 9 CCH, 1974 StAND.-FED. TAX REt. 70,741. In view of the
hazards .involved in meeting the first prong -of Williams Packing such reliance seems .well
founded. In fact, where a taxpayer failed to demonstrate that the Governnient could not
ultimately prevail as to the validity of its'assessment upon trial, a court granted- §62f3(a)
relief upon failure of the Service to'issue the "60-day notice of deficiency. Id..
78. Because the court found no requirement for a notice of deficiency, §6213(a) injunctive- relief was .not available.
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adequate legal remedy.79 The court then apparently nullified the first prong
by stating that no deficiency had been shown8s This type of reasoning is
disturbing because it tends to expand the power matrix available to the
Service. Thus, the section 6213(a) exception to section 7421(a) is not available
to a taxpayer whenever a court follows the Service's contention that no notice
of deficiency is required. The limited procedural safeguards 81 noted in
Rambo, as well as the Tax Court forum, 8 2 are also negatived. The Service
can, therefore, terminate a taxable year 83 and seize assets while precluding a
petition to the Tax Court.
A related problem emanates from the Service's power to use the jeopardy
procedures for other than revenue-related motives. The potential for abuse
and the necessity for adequate judicial response are well demonstrated in
Willits v. Richardson. 4 In that case a search of the taxpayer's purse at the
police station following a traffic arrest revealed "a few pills" and 4,400 dollars
in cash. 5 A subsequent call to an agent connected with the Narcotics Project8- of the IRS resulted in termination of the plaintiff's taxable year
and assessment of taxes on alleged income from drug sales.87 An immediate
demand for payment and levy upon the taxpayer's personal property were
made. The taxpayer then sued for injunctive relief, whereupon the Service
interposed section 7421(a) as a defense. The district court concluded that
no notice of deficiency was required under a section 6851 termination, following Irving, and furthermore that neither prong of the Williams Packing
88
test was satisfied.
79. See note 72 supra.
80. 479 F.2d at 25, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at 81,860. The court also commented on the taxpayer's lack of "clean hands" and quoted the lower court: "[lit is bearable inequity that
those whose 'bold plans' are frustrated may suffer potentially costly inconveniences." Id.
While the conduct by the taxpayers in Irving may have been socially undesirable, the
Service had, perhaps, firm evidence on which to base its assessment. Id. at 22, 1973-2 U.S.T.C.
at 81,857. This has not always been the case; see text accompanying notes 84-94 infra.
Furthermore, the lack of rapid access to the Tax Court by a jeopardy taxpayer appears
to be an additional penalty not meant to be imposed by Congress in enacting §6851. The
harsh result of tax prepayment before litigation can easily financially ruin a taxpayer.
81. See note 73 supra.
82. See note 35 supra.
83. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §6851(a).
84. 362 F. Supp. 456, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 9602 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
85. "[T]he police report indicated that only a few pills contained in two vials had
been found in Mrs. Willits purse .... ." Id. 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at 81,945. Several diamond
rings worn by plaintiff were surrendered to police at their request. Id. 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at
81,944.
86. In Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 114-15, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 9687, at 85,229 (5th Cir.
1974), the court said: "Until quite recently there has been a paucity of litigation on the
issue before this Court despite the lengthy codal coexistence of §§6851 and 6861. The
emergence of the issue seems primarily attributable to the Service's recent pattern of its
willingness to utilize §6851 in conjunction with requests from BNDD in narcotics enforcement activities."
87. 362 F. Supp. at 459, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at 81,945; 1973 taxable income was computed
to be $60,000 on sales of cocaine, although the method used was not stated in the opinion.
88. Relying on the evidence obtained by the possibly illegal police search, the district
court determined that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the first prong-that the Govern-
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In reversing the decision of the district court,

9

the Fifth Circuit found

"no basis in fact nor foundation for any reasonable assumption" that Mrs.
Willits was connected with any narcotics sales90 Thus, the court concluded
that "the evidence adduced established such a gossamer basis for the drastic
actions of the Internal Revenue Service that they cannot be sustained." 91
Therefore, the first prong of the Williams Packing test was satisfied. 92 The
court also held that seizure of Mrs. Willits' means of supporting her children
and herself constituted irreparable harm for which a refund suit could not
provide an adequate legal remedy because of the tremendous time delays
involved. 93 Recognizing the dire consequences that unrestrained Service power
could portend, the court observed:
The I.R.S. has been given broad power to take possession of the
the property of citizens by summary means that ignore many basic
tenets of due process in order to prevent the loss of tax revenues.
Courts cannot allow these expedients to be turned on citizens suspected of wrongdoing-not as tax collection devices but as summary

punishment to supplement or complement regular criminal procedures.
The fact that they are cloaked in the garb of a tax collection and
applied only by the Narcotics Project to those believed to be engaged
in or associated with the narcotics trade must not bootstrap judicial

approval of such use. 94

A final ambiguity arising in this area is the viability of certain constitutional arguments. Although the taxpayer in Willits alleged that an illegal
search and seizure had been made, the Fifth Circuit declined to consider this
issue. 95 Such a consideration was not necessary in light of the finding of an
arbitrary assessment. Had the court used such an approach, however, it
could have buttressed its finding that the Government could not prevail, because there is case authority indicating that illegal evidence cannot be used
ment could not possibly prevail. In so doing, the court ignored its own statement that
it was not necessary to determine the legality of the search. As to the second prong, the
court concluded that an adequate legal remedy was available through a refund suit after
filing a return for the full taxable year. Alternatively, if the Service disagreed with the
full year return, it could issue a §6212(a) notice of deficiency, allowing Tax Court jurisdiction. 362 F. Supp. at 461, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at 81,947.
89. 497 F.2d 240, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 9583 (5th Cir. 1974).
90. Id. at 245, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. at 84,835.
91. Id. See also Woods v. McKeever, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. ff9727 (D. Ariz. 1973) (arbitrary
assessment satisfied first prong of Williams Packing).
92. Id. at 245-46, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. at 84,836. The court followed the test announced in
Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d 565, 573, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 16,075, at 81,368-69 (5th Cir.
1973), that: "[A] taxpayer under a jeopardy assessment is entitled to an injunction
against collection of the tax if the Internal Revenue Service's assessment is entirely excessive, arbitrary, capricious, and without factual foundation, and equity jurisdiction
otherwise exists."
93. Willits v. Richardson, 497 F.2d 240, 246, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 9583, at 84,836 (5th
Cir. 1974).
94. Id. Accord, Woods v. McKeever, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 9527 (D. Ariz. 1973), appeal
docketed, No. 74-1133, 9th Cir., Jan. 25, 1974.
95. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss2/5

14

Candelora and Hawkes: Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 7421(a), The Anti-Injuncti
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW RE'IEW

[Vol. XXVII

to support a jeopardy assessment. In fact, where a taxpayer, arrested on a
traffic violation, had his car searched and was interrogated without benefit
of Miranda warnings, the blatant constitutional violations were held to
satisfy the first prong of Williams Packing.96 Because all of the plaintiff's
assets were frozen, irreparable harm without an adequate legal remedy was
present to satisfy the second prong and permit injunctive relief. Unfortunately, the weight of case authority suggests that constitutional objections are
overwhelmingly ignored by acquiescence to the jurisdictional precedent of
section 7421(a) .97
It seems desirable that the Service not be permitted to continue making
thinly supported assessments in "criminal" cases where there is no evidence
to sustain a prosecution. Such a bifurcated system of justice, with an administrative agency essentially imposing sanctions for the appearance of a
deviation from an undefined norm, has inherent dangers that this pluralistic
society cannot tolerate. Historically, individual rights have been asserted
and protected against the state in this country. Erosion of these rights through
abrogation of well developed constitutional theories presages a trend that
should alarm even the ardent apologist for administrative shortcut tactics in
pursuance of "control" of drug-related and other activities at variance with
agency norms. Tolerance of the developing pattern may result in domination
,of the acquiescent citizen.
Gambling Tax Cases
Is It a Tax? Initial attacks on the Wagering Tax9" centered on the legality
of the tax itself. Challengers either claimed that it was an attempt to regulate
behavior rather than an exercise of the taxing power or that it was outside
the congressional power to tax. As the effect of the law was to increase
revenue, however, it was held to be an exercise of the taxing power, which
could not be rendered invalid merely because it had a deterrent effect on
the activity taxed. 99 Therefore, attempts to avoid the strictures of section
96. Anderson v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Fla. 1973). Despite an assurance
by the Service that his returns were in order, the taxpayer learned on the next day
that the IRS had attached his assets in a safety deposit box, joint checking and savings
accounts, and had also placed a lien on his home. At a hearing for emergency injunctive
relief, the IRS spokesman admitted that he saw no way in which the Service could succeed
on the jeopardy assessment. Id. at 365.
97. E.g., LaLonde v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 976, 1972-2 U.S.T.C. 9756 (D. Minn.
1972), afJ'd, 478 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973), plaintiff argued that a jeopardy assessment was
made for the purpose of obtaining records to uncover sources of printed materials that
he retailed and this violated his first amendment rights. Strict application of the first
prong of the Williams Packing test resulted in acquiescence to §7421(a) and rejection of
the constitutional argument.
98. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §4401. The language of the provision is set out in note
1 supra.
99. In United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. 9245 (1953), appellee
argued that the Wagering Tax was an attempt on the part of Congress to regulate intrastate
crime by imposing a penalty on the activity under the pretext of taxation. Additionally,
because the tax had the effect of deterring gambling, it was alleged to be an infringement
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7421(a) on the basis that the "tax" caused an unconstitutional deprivation
of property without due process of law were dismissed out of hand. Courts
merely noted "it is settled law that the wagering tax itself ...[is] constitutional."100
. Is the Government "Attempting To Assess or Collect" Taxes? In 1968 the
Supreme Court held that criminal sanctions could not be imposed on a
01
and occupationalo2
person who failed to comply with the registration
provisions of the Wagering Tax. The Court reasoned that such actions
03
would violate the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
It later applied this same rationale to prohibit criminal prosecution for
failure to pay the Wagering Tax. 0 4 Finally, in United States v. United States
Coin & Currency,05 the Supreme Court held the fifth amendment privilege
applicable in proceedings for forfeiture of "property intended for use in
violating the provisions of the internal revenue laws."1 06 In that case the
Court found a "forfeiture" resulting from a statutory offense to be indis07
tinguishable from a "criminal fine."'
Although none of these cases concerned the tax per se, persons facing
Wagering Tax assessments have attempted to avoid the application of section 7421(a) by asserting the same rationale. The central theme in each case
has been that the government's motivation is punishment, not revenue, and
on the states' police power and thus violative of the tenth amendment. Noting the extensiveness of the taxing power and focusing on the revenue-generating effect of the
Wagering Tax, the Supreme Court upheld the tax.
100. Trent v. United States, 442 F.2d 405, 406, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 5,995, at 87,091 (6th
Cir. 1971). It has also been argued that Congress' failure to provide for Tax Court review
of Wagering Tax assessments results in a deprivation of property in violation of the fifth
amendment. The rationale is that the prerequisite to refund litigation, full payment of
the assessment, is an intolerable burden. Courts, however, seizing upon the dicta in
Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 175 n.38, that "excise tax assessments may be divisible into a tax on each transaction or event, so that the full-payment rule would
probably require no more than payment of a small amount," have uniformly rejected the
contention. They hold that making partial payment a prerequisite to contesting the
assessment does not violate due process. E.g., Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337, 1342, 1971-1
U.S.T.C. 15,986, at 87,071 (6th Cir. 1971); Bowers v. United States, 423 F.2d 1207, 1208,
1970-2 U.S.T.C. 9560, at 84,364 (5th Cir. 1970); Vuin v. Burton, 327 F.2d 967, 970, 1964-1
U.S.T.C. 15,553, at 92,525 (6th Cir. 1964).
101.
INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, §4412(a) provides that "[e]ach person required to pay a
special tax under the subchapter shall register with the official in charge of the internal
revenue district .... "
102. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §4411 provides: "There shall be imposed a special tax
of $50 per year to be paid by each person who is liable for tax under section 4401 or who
is engaged in receiving wagers for or on behalf of any person so liable."
103. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 115,800 (1968).
104. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 15,801 (1968).
105. 401 U.S. 715, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 5,979 (1971).
106. INT. REv.CODE OF 1954, §7302.
107. The Court said: "From the relevant constitutional standpoint there is no difference
between a man who 'forfeits' $8,674 because he has used the money in illegal gambling
activities and a man who pays a 'criminal fine' of $8,674 as a result of the same course
of conduct." 401 U.S. at 718, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. at 87,050.
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thus a suit seeking to enjoin the governmental action is not intended to
restrain the "assessment or correction of a tax." For example, in White v.
United States,10 the Service used plaintiff's personal records as a basis
for computing the Wagering Tax assessment. Because this action made the
'plaintiff a witness against himself, he attempted to invoke the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination in his suit for injunctive relief. He argued
that because a Wagering Tax assessment has the same consequences as a
forfeiture, the Coin Currency rationale extended to him the fifth amendment protection. This argument was rejected on two grounds. First, the
court found an "essential difference" between the two proceedings: forfeiture involves property that a person could have retained had he complied
with the law; a tax assessment, on the other hand, applies to money that
would have gone to the Government had the law been obeyed. 10 9 Moreover,
the logical extension of the plaintiff's argument would be to preclude the
possibility of imposing a tax on income derived from illegal activities, a
result expressly disavowed in Coin Currency.'" Thus, because the government's action was cast as a revenue measure, not a penalty, section 7421(a)
barred the injunction.
Another perspective was taken in Ianelli v. Long."' The district court noted
that a forced sale in satisfaction of a Wagering Tax assessment might cause
plaintiff's property to be sold at much less than market value. Therefore, it
held that "a tax sale of all property

. . .

without the opportunity to contest

it in a court of law is for all intents and purposes a forfeiture, not a tax."'' 1 2
Accordingly, section 7421(a) did not prevent the court from issuing an injunction, effective until the plaintiff could appropriately contest the assessment without danger of self-incrimination. 113 The Third Circuit reversed
the focus, however, and with it the decision.114 While agreeing that "the
section [7421(a)] presupposes a bona fide attempt of the government to
collect revenue," the court held that these levies satisfied the requirement

108.

363 F. Supp. 31, 1973-2 U.S.T.C.

16,117 (N.D. Ill. 1973).

109. This distinction was articulated in United States v. Donlon,
223, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 16,090, at 81,400 (D. Del. 1973), a case that the
in support of its "essential difference" remark. 363 F. Supp. at 35, 1973-2
110. Urban v. United States, 445 F.2d 641, 643 (5th Cir. 1971), also

355 F. Supp. 220,
White court cited
U.S.T.C. at 82,776.
cited in White v.

United States, 363 F. Stpp. at 35, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at 82,776, stated this reason.
111. 333 F. Supp. 407, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 16,021 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
112. Id. at 412, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. at 88,096.
113. The court attempted to buttress its circumvention of §7421(a) by stating that
because it was issuing only a temporary injunction and was ordering a receiver to handle
the property in the interim, its decision was "not really to prohibit but only to defer
collection of the taxes ...
." Id. at 413, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. at 88.096. But §7421(a) does not

distinguish between temporary and permanent injunctions, and its central purpose is to
avoid delay in the collection of government revenue. Thus, this statement does no more

than show that the court was responding to the equities of the situation rather than the
language of the Act.
114. Iannelli v. Long, 487 F.2d 317, 1973-2 U.S.T.C.

Supp. 407, 1971-2 U.S.T.C.

16,098 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'g 333 F.

16,021 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
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because they constituted a "potentially productive attempt to collect revenue." Any other governmental objectives were immaterial.- 15
The message of White and lanelli is clear. So long as the court can discern
a nexus between the government's action and procurement of its legal entitlements, section 7421(a) will bar a taxpayer's suit for injunctive relief.
Still another facet of the problem is exemplified by two cases in which
the plaintiffs attacked the magnitude and method of the assessment. Where
the Service projected the amount of wagers handled in a ten-month period
from evidence of plaintiff's actual wagering in the preceding five-year period,
the Seventh Circuit rejected plaintiff's contention that the assessment was
so arbitrary that it became necessary to question the bona-fides of the
government's revenue-raising objective.""' On the other hand, when confronted with an assessment of $2,653,640 that was derived by projecting one
day's betting slips over an arbitrarily determined period of four years and
nine months, the Fifth Circuit remanded for findings of fact as to "whether
the computative basis is so insufficient as to make the assessment an exaction in 'the guise of a tax' rather than a legitimate tax on wagers."".17 With
reference to section 7421(a), the court stated: "A finding that the assessment
is arbitrary, capricious, and without foundation in fact would free the
l8
Court of the constraint of the anti-injunction statute.""
As these latter two cases show, the section 7421(a) bar is formidable but
not absolute. Upon a clear showing that the Service is abusing its statutory
authority to assess or collect taxes, courts will find the actions outside the
protective shield of section 7421(a).
Can the Tax Be Collected? The third category of Wagering Tax injunction suits comprises cases where the plaintiff, although conceding that the
tax itself is legal and that the government's objective is to obtain revenue,
contends that, on the facts presented, no tax can legally be assessed against
him. This is the Nut Margarine-WilliamsPacking situation, and the plaintiff

115. Id. at 318, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. at 82,728.
116. Collins v. Daly, 437 F.2d 736, 738, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 116,976, at 87,041 (7th Cir.
1971). Other cases that have acknowledged the validity of this argument, although finding
that the particular facts did not meet its requirements, are: Ianneli v. Long, 487 F.2d 317,
1973.2 U.S.T.C. 716,098 (3d Cir. 1973); Cole v. Cardoza, 441 F.2d 1337, 1971-1 U.S.T.C.
15,986 (6th Cir. 1971); Hamilton v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 468, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. %15,924
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
117. Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d 565, 575, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 116,075 at 81,371 (5th
Cir. 1973). Similarly, in Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. 15,886
(2d Cir. 1969), the court held that projecting wagers over an arbitrarily determined fiveyear period on the basis of three days' receipts was so "totally excessive . . . because
based on entirely inadequate information, [that] collection should be enjoined if equity
jurisdiction otherwise exists." Id. at 584, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. at 85,027.
118. 474 F.2d at 577, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. at 81,372. Of course, the ordinary requirements
of equity jurisdiction, irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law, would also
have to be established before an injunction would be issued. The court remanded for
findings of fact on this question. Id.
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stands or falls on his ability to meet the two-pronged Williams Packing
test."9
An interesting, but unsuccessful, constitutional argument was raised in
Lucia v. United States.120 Under a provision declaring the ordinary three-year
1
inapplicable where no return is filed,1 22 the Governstatute of limitations 21
ment assessed a Wagering Tax almost six years after the last transaction.
Lucia sued for injunctive relief, claiming that he could not constitutionally
be denied the benefit of the statute of limitations, and thus under no circumstances could the Government ultimately prevail. He argued that filing
a return would have violated his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, a denial of the benefit of the statute of limitations
constituted a penalty for the assertion of a constitutional right. The Fifth
Circuit disagreed, however,123 holding that "there is no substantive or fundamental right to the shelter of a period of limitations."'1 24 Therefore, because
the plaintiff had not been denied anything to which he was otherwise entitled, the inapplicability of the limitation period did not constitute a
penalty.
A more persuasive constitutional argument was raised in Pizzarello v.
United States. 25 In a suit to enjoin a levy for unpaid wagering taxes, plaintiff
claimed that under no circumstances could the Government prevail because
the assessment was based on evidence seized in violation of his fourth amendment rights. After concluding that there was no Supreme Court precedent
on point, the Second Circuit applied the exclusionary rule and held the
26
assessment invalid.1
119. In order to qualify for an injunction under Williams Packing, the taxpayer
must show: (1) that under no circumstances can the Government prevail, and (2) that
equity jurisdiction otherwise exists. For further amplification, see text accompanying
notes 26-34 supra.
120. 474 F.2d 565, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 16,075 (5th Cir. 1973).
121. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6501(a) provides in pertinent part: "Limitations on
assessment and collection (a) General rule.-Except as otherwise provided in this section,
the amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the
return was filed . . . and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection
of such tax shall be begun after the expiration of such period."
122. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6501(c) provides in pertinent part: "(c) Exceptions.-(3)
No Return.-In the case of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding
in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time."
123. Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d 565, 569-70, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 16,075, at 81,366 (5th
Cir. 1973).
124. Id. at 572, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. at 81,368.
125. 408 F.2d 579, 1969-I U.S.T.C. 15,886 (2d Cir. 1969).
126. Id. at 586, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. at 85,028-29. Of course, this satisfied only the first
prong of the Williams Packing test. He still had to satisfy the second prong of the test,
by showing that he was entitled to equitable relief because he would suffer irreparable
harm for which there was no adequate remedy at law, before an injunction would issue.
The court remanded for findings of fact on this question. Id. at 587, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. at
85,030. Compare this result with the approach taken in the Jeopardy Assessment area (see
note 97 supra and accompanying test) where the court refused to permit the taxpayer to
invoke the fourth amendment as a basis for satisfying the first prong of the Williams
Packing test.
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Another successful attack on an attempted government collection was
made in Cole v. Cardoza.1 27 The Government had obtained a lien on the
plaintiff's residence to satisfy overdue gambling taxes. Finding that under
applicable law a federal tax lien solely against a husband could not attach to property owned by him as a tenant by the entirety, the court declared
12
the lien void.
Summay. As these cases show, attempts to characterize the Gambling
Tax as a penalty have been unsuccessful, and section 7421(a) presents a
formidable barrier to relief from its assessments. If a nexus between legal
revenue and the government's action can be discerned, the Act will be
applied."29 On the other hand, if the assessment is so outrageous as to bear
no resemblance to a "tax," the Service has not been permitted to hide its
extra-legal actions behind the shield of section 7421(a).130 Finally, even in
cases seemingly within the scope of the Act, courts have granted relief where
the facts satisfy the Williams Packing requirements. While constitutional
claims alone are insufficient to invoke this exception,"'3 they can be used to
satisfy the first prong.
Perhaps the most important message conveyed by these cases is the courts'
reluctance to apply section 7421(a) mechanically. Rather, they have examined
each factual situation to assure that the purpose of the Act would be served,
before applying its strictures. The desirability of this purpose-oriented approach is obvious, the application of section 7421(a) makes the Service's determination of the rights of the parties binding. Where such a situation reflects the will of the people, as interpreted by Congress, it must be obeyed.
But courts must carefully examine each factual circumstance in order to
ensure that they do not abdicate to the Service their role as final arbiter
of the rights of men in contexts beyond those contemplated by Congress. The
potential for abuse inherent in such situations is too great to be tolerated."'2
127. 441 F.2d 1337, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. %15,986 (6th Cir. 1971).
128. The Government had conceded that it had "no valid claim" against Cole's home.
Id. at 1348, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. at 87,071. Thus, appellant satisfied the first prong of the
Williams Packing test-assured success on the merits. As the court found that the tax lien
would cast "doubt [on] the title of the property and cause reasonably prudent purchasers
to refuse to accept it until they were certain the title was clear," the court held that
appellant was entitled to have the lien removed. Id. at 1344, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. at 87,072.
129. This interpretation of §7421(a)'s scope parallels the conclusion recently reached
by the Supreme Court. See discussion of Bob Jones and "Americans United" accompanying
notes 201-210 infra.
130. But compare with this conclusion the Supreme Court's rejection of Bob Jones
University's argument that its suit was not for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of a tax, because the Service's objective in removing the school's tax-exempt
status was unrelated to revenue. See discussion accompanying notes 204-205 infra.
131. Similarly, in "Americans United" the Supreme Court held that the institution's
claim that the invocation of §7421(a) deprived it of due process of law was insufficient to
avoid application of the act. See discussion accompanying notes 235-247 infra.
132. But compare the Supreme Court's decision in "Americans United," where the
Court held §7421 barred the action despite strong evidence that a suit for injunctive
relief provided the only access to meaningful judicial review, See discussion accompanying
notes 227-237 infra.
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PROHIBITION

Background
In addition to its function as a revenue-generating device, the Internal
Revenue Code is a vehicle for implementing congressional policies. One
such policy is a tax subsidy for organizations carrying out functions that
otherwise would be funded through federal programs. 133 Thus, Congress
has provided in section 501(a) that income of certain organizations shall be
exempt from specified federal taxation if the organization is one that is
13
described in sections 401(d), 501(c), or 501(d). 1
Included in the list of organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3) are
corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation; 13 thus, individuals, partnerships, and formless aggregations of persons cannot qualify.
Assuming compliance with this structural requirement, an organization
seeking tax-exempt status faces a series of hurdles that must be negotiated
from two perspectives: its organization and its operations. 136 The "organizational" requirement examines the dominant purpose for which the organization was created, focusing on substance, not form. 137 The operational test
essentially requires that the organization's actual activities comport with its
stated purposes while not contravening any of the statutory prohibitions. 3
Although the statute specifies that the organization must be "organized and
operated exclusively" for certain enumerated purposes, courts have con133. See Garrett, Federal Tax Limitations on Political Activities of Public Interest
and Educational Organizations, 59 GEO. LJ. 561 (1971). Sections 501(c)(3) and 170 of the
Code have been characterized as reflecting a "Congressional disposition favoring various
types of charitable organizations deemed beneficial to society . . . [by making them] objects
of federal support through tax policy." Note, The Loss of Privileged Tax Status in Suits To
Restrain Assessments, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 573, 575 (1973).
134. INT. REV. CODF OF 1954, §501(a) provides tax exemptions to the organizations
described in 501(c)(3): "Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to animals, no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office."
135. See note 134 supra.
136. TREAS. REG. §1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1).
137. In Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74, 84, 1956-2 U.S.T.C.
ff9896, at 56,385 (D.N.J. 1956), the court said that an organization must be "created to perform" or "established to promote" a proper purpose. Merely having powers that are limited
to proper purposes is not sufficient. Thus, the charter and bylaws are not conclusive, but
may be supplemented or rebutted by extrinsic evidence of purpose, Faulkner v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 987, 1940-2 U.S.T.C. %9544 (Ist Cir. 1940); Journal of Accountancy, Inc., 16
B.T.A. 1260 (1929). The Service has proclaimed that the organization's purpose must be
proper, and its power substantially limited to such purpose, in order to satisfy the
organizational test. See TREAS. REC. §§1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(i)(a), (b).
138. See TREAs. REG. §§1.501(c)(3)-1(c). The text of the statute is set out in note 134
supra.
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sistently and liberally1 39 construed the term "exclusively" to mean "principal140
ly" or "primarily."'
Unfortunately, the other requirements of the provision have not received
such uniform construction. For example, the requirement that "no substantial
part of the activities... is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation," has resulted in a confusing array of interpretations.
"Legislation" is defined in the Regulations to include action by any legislative body or by the public in a referendum. 141 There is, however, a wide
divergence of opinion over exactly what constitutes "attempting to influence"
legislation. The Service has broadly interpreted the provision to include
any activity tending to influence the outcome of legislation-even if only
by influencing public opinion on an issue. 14 2 It has also ruled that any
organization that actively advocates a primary objective obtainable only by
legislation or the defeat of proposed legislation cannot qualify for section
501(c)(3) status. 4 3 The legislative history of the provisions,144 although inconclusive, suggests that Congress intended to preclude only politically selfserving donations,- 45 and that the broadly stated prohibition was a drafting
189. Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 1935-1 U.S.T.C. 9001 (1934). The rule of construction that provisions granting exemptions to charities are to be construed liberally is derived from the idea that such provisions are "begotten from motives of public policy." Id.
at 151, 1935-1 U.S.T.C. at 9403. The Service expressly adopted this rule in G.C.M. 21,610,
1939-2 Cum. BULL. 103. While this ruling was declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 67-46, 1967-1
Cm. BULL. 377, there was no indication of a modification of the Service's view on this
matter. See 6 J. MmmTrNs, supra note 9, §34.03.
140. Courts, in a rare display of uniformity in this area, have held that this requirement is satisfied if the activities that comprise a substantial portion of the organization's
total operations pertain to a proper purpose. E.g., Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362, 1960-1
U.S.T.C. 11,916 (2d Cir. 1959); Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907, 1956-1 U.S.T.C.
9135 (6th Cir. 1955); William L. Powell Foundation v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 68, 1955-1
U.S.T.C. 9398 (7th Cir. 1955).
141.

See TREAs. REG. §§1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(3)(ii)(b).

142. TREAs. Rm. §§l.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(ii)(a), (b). This approach assumes that political
activity is inconsistent with charitable purposes. Therefore, if any nexus can be shown,
the activity is improper and the organization is denied §501(c)(3) status. But such groups,
termed "Action Organizations" by the Service, may be eligible for a tax exemption under
§501(c)(4) of the Code.
143. TREAs. REc. §§1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iv). Consistent with its premise that legislative
activity is inconsistent with charitable purposes, the Service does not distinguish between
political activity in furtherance of what might be considered a proper purpose, and
political activity motivated by other concerns. The Regulations do require, however, that
the organization do more than merely engage in nonpartisan analysis, study, or research,
with the results made available to the public, in order to be classified as an "action"
organization outside the scope of §501(c)(3). Such activity would fit within the "Education"
classification, and thus should not be condemned as an attempt to influence legislation.
144. For debate on the provision, see 78 CON.. RaEc. 5861, 5959, 7831 (1934). See also
110 CONG. REc. 5078-79 (1964).

145. With respect to the purpose of §501(c)(3), Senator Reed said: "There is no reason
in the world why a contribution made to the National Economy League should be deductible as if it were a charitable contribution if it is a selfish one made to advance the
personal interests of the giver of the money. This is what the committee was trying to

reach .... " 78 CONG. REc. 5861 (1934) (emphasis added). Such an analysis would start
from the premise that charitable purposes and political activities are not mutually ex-
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1 46

Judicial opinion is split with respect to this question. The majority of
courts follow Judge Learned Hand's statement that: "[P]olitical agitation as
such is outside the statute, however innocent the aim. . . . Controversies of
that sort must be conducted without public subvention; the Treasury stands
aside from them.""1 7 Section 501(c)(3) is thus interpreted as a broad prohibition against political activity.141 Other courts have found political activity
consistent with proper purpose, 49 and therefore, not grounds for denial of
section 501(c) (3) status. Still others have concluded that the phrase refers
150
The only certain conclusion
only to direct communication with legislators.
to be drawn from these divergent views is that an organization cannot be
sure when it is engaging in activities that "influence legislation" and imperil
its tax-exempt status.' 5 '
The further requirement of section 501(c)(3), that legislation-influencing
clusive. If it could be shown that the political activity is in fact in furtherance of the
organization's charitable purpose, the activity would not be a potential cause of preferred
tax status revocation.
146. In reference to the provision of §501(c)(3) prohibiting political activity, Senator
Reed stated: "[W]e found great difficulty in phrasing the amendment. I do not reproach
the draftsmen. I think we gave them an impossible task; but this amendment goes further
than the committee intended to go." 78 CoNG. REC. 5861 (1934).
147. Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184, 185, 2 U.S.T.C. 552, at 2302 (2d Cir. 1930).
148 In Estate of Blaine, 22 T.C. 1195, 1213 (1954), the court denied charitable deductions for contributions made to an organization whose "ultimate aim . . . was the attainment of a political objective." Similarly, preferred tax status was denied because of attempts to mold public opinion in favor of a certain revision of the law in American Hardware & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 126, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. 9221 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952). Accord, Kuper v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 562, 1964-2 U.S.T.C.
9541 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, "79 U.S. 920 (1964); Marshall v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d
75, 1945-1 U.S.T.C. 10,166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 872 (1945).
149. These courts responded to Judge Hand's dictum in Slee v. Commissioner, 42
F.2d 184, 185, 2 U.S.T.C. 552, at 2302 (2d Cir. 1930), that political activity that was
"mediate to the primary purpose" would not be improper. In Dulles v. Johnson, 273
F.2d 362, 1960-1 U.S.T.C. 11,916 (2d Cir. 1959), the court found the activities of a bar
association, including reporting to the legislature on proposed and existing legislation, to
be beneficial to the public. It therefore permitted donations made in support of these
actions to be taken as §170 charitable deductions. Accord, International Reform Fed'n v.
District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 131 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Martha H. Davis, 22
T.C. 1091 (1954).
150. Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907, 1956-1 U.S.T.C. 9135 (6th Cir. 1955).
This interpretation attempted to restrict the prohibition against influencing legislation
by focusing on the form of the activity rather than on its purpose. Prohibiting direct
lobbying but permitting "grass roots" lobbying has been criticized as allowing an organization to do indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly. See Note, The Revenue Code
and a Charity's Politics, 73 YALe: L.J. 661, 673 n.56 (1964).
151. Another factor adding to the organization's uncertainty is the selective and
sporadic nature of the Service's enforcement of §501(c)(3). For example, it has been suggested
that the Sierra Club lost its §501(c)(3) status not for the opinion it expressed in a full page
ad, but because of the openness with which it acted. See Note, The Internal Revenue Codes
Provisions Against Legislative Activity on the Part of Tax Exempt Organizations: A Legitimate Safeguard or a Violation of the First Amendment?, 3 N.Y.U.L. & SOCIAL CHANGE 159,
164 (1973).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 5

1975]

THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT

activities may not constitute a "substantial" part of the organization's
operations, presents a similar but distinct problem. In Seasongood v. Cormissionerl 52 the Sixth Circuit. concluded that attempts to influence legislation
were not substantial when constituting only five per cent of the organization's
total activities.' 53 Unfortunately, the court's attempt to quantify the statutory
term has not generally been followed. 54 Rather, weight has been given to
more qualitative factors such as the sporadic nature of the legislative activity, 55 the amount of time spent on such activities in comparison to the
total activities of the organization,56 and the benefit that the group's over-all
57
activities bestow on the community.
An additional problem in determining substantiality is the question of
how much, if any, of the organization's supporting activities should be considered. In Kuper v. Commissioner4s8 the time devoted by the League of
Women Voters in discussing issues, formulating alternatives, and agreeing
on a position with respect to various legislative measures was taken into
account in determining the substantiality of the time spent attempting to
influence legislation. Another court impliedly rejected this position by refusing to disallow deductions for contributions to the same organization,
because its "sporadic forays into the political arena were of little consequence [when] viewed against the background of the whole of their
efforts in behalf of better government."' 159 Perhaps the only conclusion that
can be reached concerning judicial guidelines in this area is that the absence of accord in defining "substantial" makes the courts' inability to define
"influencing legislation" less problematical.
Several commentators have suggested that the restraints imposed by section 501(c)(3) on political activity should be totally or partially removed.4 0
Because section 162(e) allows a business expense deduction for direct lobbying
activities, organizations such as public interest groups arguably should be permitted to use political means to create an adversary viewpoint representative
of segments of society that lack political or economic power. Imposition of
Political sterility on these organizations also seems contrary to the first and
152.
153.

227 F.2d 907, 1956-1 U.S.T.C. §9135 (6th Cir. 1955).
Id. at 912, 1956-1 US.T.C. at 54,210.

154. See Note, supra note 151, at 162.
155. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 759, 766, 1954-2
U.S.T.C. 9537, at 46,403 (W.D. Ky. 1954).
156.

Kuper v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 562, 1964-2 U.S.T.C.

9541

(3d Cir.), cert.

denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964); League of Women Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp.
379, 1960-1 U.S.T.C. 11,924 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
157.

Compare Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362, 1960-1 U.S.T.C.

11,916 (2d Cir. 1959)

(donations to a bar association, which reported to the legislature on existing and proposed
legislation, held deductible), with Hammerstin v. Kelley, 235 F. Supp. 60, 1964-2 U.S.T.C.
112,269 (E.D. Mo. 1964), afl'd, 349 F.2d 928, 1965-2 U.S.T.C.

12,343 (8th Cir. 1965) (con-

tributions to medical society held not deductible because its political and legislative
activities were substantial).
158. 332 F.2d 562, 1964-2 U.S.T.C. 9541 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964).
159. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.United States, 122 F. Supp. 759, 766, 1954-2
U.S.T.C. 19537, at 46,403 (W.D. Ky. 1954).
160. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 133; Note, supra-note 151.
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fourteenth amendments.61 Indeed it is difficult to find any basis that justifies
16
this unequal treatment.

2

Although section 501(c)(3) exempts organizations for "charitable . . . or
educational purposes," ' 16 3 the Supreme Court has recently concluded that the
common law concept of charity-benefit to the entire society-subsumes all
section 501(c)(3) classifications.'61 As a result, section 501(c) (3) status has
been denied, for example, to educational institutions that discriminate on
the basis of race 165 The net effect of these varying judicial and administrative
interpretations of ambiguous statutory language, exacerbated by arbitrary
enforcement, is that an organization cannot be certain of its compliance with
the requirements for tax-exempt status. Because an organization attempting
to enjoin revocation or denial of section 501(c)(3) status must either demonstrate that it is outside the scope of the section 7421(a) prohibition, or that
it can satisfy the stringent Williams Packing test, this interpretational uncertainty over the parameters of permissible action places a virtually insuperable burden on the organization.
Lower Court Decisions GrantingInjunctive Relief
Informative in determining the scope of section 7421(a) are several recent cases in which taxpayers successfully enjoined the Service from affording
tax-exempt status to certain private organizations. Attempts to circumvent
federal court integration orders resulted in the formation of numerous
white-only private schools, many of which were accorded section 501(c) (3)
161. See Note, supra note 151, at 166-76.
162. One counter-argument is that because corporations pay taxes and 501(c)(3)
organizations do not, a taxpayer may be forced to support a distasteful viewpoint if
exempt groups are allowed to lobby. This ignores, however, the direct tax subsidies
such as oil depletion allowances that support the corporate establishment. Additionally,
the corporate goal of profit maximization has not suffered because of an overabundance
of concern for social issues. The economic power of the country is increasingly concentrated in corporations. See Berle, Property, Production, and Revolution, 65 COLtUM. L.
REV. 1 (1965). Corporate subsidies tend to cluster at one end of the socio-economic
spectrum. Tax exempt organizations represent %irtually the only viable adversary viewpoint with a capability to illuminate the other end. Without indirect tax subsidies through
allowances of lobbying, the omnipotence of corporate wealth may tend to impose increasingly unilateral approaches on congressional action.
163. The entire text of §501(c)(3) is set out in note 134 supra.
164. In Alexander v. "Americans United," Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2053, 2065 n.10, 1974-1
U.S.T.C. 19439, at 84,082 n.10 (1974), it was noted that "the §501(c)(3) revocation is
arrived at by the Commissioner not solely by construing the language of §501(c)(3), but
by his assertion that that section and §170(a)(l) and (c)(2)(D) are in pari materia. Thus,
the idiosyncracies of the word 'charitable' in §170(a)(1) are engrafted upon, and entwined
with, the 'organized and operated exclusively for religious charitable . . . or educational
purposes' standard of §501(c)(3)." Accord, Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1157-61,
1971-2 U.S.T.C. 9529, at 87, 146-49 (D.D.C.), ajJ'd per curiamn sub non. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997, 1972-1 U.S.T.C. %9123A (1971) (conclusion that "educational purposes" require actions in best interests of society as a whole, as opposed to a limited group, derived
from law of charitable trusts).
165. Green v. Conally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 9529 (D.D.C.). afl'd per
curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997, 1972-1 U.S.T.C. 9123A (1971).
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status. In Green v. Kennedy166 black plaintiffs sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the exemptions amounted to government aid
of racial discrimination in violation of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. Although the Service had changed its position in the interim and
construed the Code to exclude such schools from tax-exempt status, 67 the
court issued a permanent injunction to ensure the plaintiffs adequate relief.168 The decision was defended on two grounds. First, discrimination
169
was found to be inconsistent with the common law notion of "charitable."'
70
Second, and more compelling,1 was the fact that affording preferred tax
status to institutions following racially discriminatory admissions practices
amounted to a frustration of federal policy against racial segregation in
education, an impermissible result because "[t]he Code must be construed
and applied in consonance with the Federal public policy."17' While the
section 7421(a) bar was not directly asserted in this case, 72 the fact that a
taxpayer was permitted to interfere with an IRS determination of section
501(c)(3) status showed that the Service's power in this area is not plenary,
a recognition long overdue.
Less than a year later, the question of the Anti-Injunction Act's applicability in this context was brought before the same court.' 73 Grasping the
166. 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 19176 (D.D.C. 1970). In the original class
action, Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 19176 (D.D.C. 1970), plaintiffs
sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Service from granting any future exemptions, pending a determination of whether the schools actually were "part of a system
of private schools operated on a racially segregated basis as an alternative to white students
seeking to avoid desegregated public schools." Id. at 1140, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. at 82,732. A
preliminary injunction was issued because the court found that the tax benefits constituted
"substantial and significant support by the Government," thus raising a question of constitutional violation if the schools in fact were part of a segregated private school pattern. Id.
at 1134, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. at 82,728. Additionally, the injunction was issued because of the
"probability of irreparable harm to plaintiffs' class and the public interest." Id. at 1139,
1970-1 U.S.T.C. at 82,781.
167. News Release, 7 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX RFP. 1 6790, 6814.
168. It was in the sequel action, Green v. Conally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1971-2 U.S.T.C.
9529 (D.D.C., aff'd per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997, 1972-1 U.S.T.C.
9123A (1971), that a permanent injunction, covering all the racially discriminating private
schools in Mississippi, was issued. The court said: "We think plaintiffs are entitled to a
declaration of relief on an enduring, permanent basis, not on a basis that could be withdrawn with a shift in the tides of administration, or changing perceptions of sound
discretion." Id. at 1170-71, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. at 87,156.
169. This conclusion was reached after an extensive discussion of the law of charitable
trusts. 830 F. Supp. at 1157-61, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. at 87,146-49.
170. The court admitted that while there was merit in interpreting Code provisions
by reference to the common law background, "the ultimate criterion for determination ...
(is] Federal policy." Id. at 1161, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. at 87,149.
171. Id. at 1163, 1971-72 U.S.T.C. at 87,151. The court pointed out that federal
public policy included the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000c to 2000d-4 (1964).
Id. at 1164, 1971-72 U.S.T.C. at 87, 151.
172. Notwithstanding this fact, one commentator has suggested that because this case
recognized the underlying issue to be one of social policy, it could be used to support the
argument that §7421(a) should not bar injunctive relief in. a case involving social policy,
because there is no question of revenue generation. See Comment, supra note 30, at 599.
173. McGlotten v. Conally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 1972-1 U.S.T.C. 9185 (D.D.C. 1972). The
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functional utility of section 7421(a) with a refreshing clarity of thought, the
court held that this indeed was a case where the "central purpose of the
[Anti-Injunction] Act is inapplicable," 174 because the plaintiff did not "seek
to limit the amount of revenue collectible by the United States."' -5 The importance of this case lies in its limitation of section 7421(a) to situations in
which a revenue effect is discernable. 17" To hold otherwise would afford the
Service essentially unlimited power in this area because it would be able to
invoke the protective shield of section 7421(a) virtually at will. Thus, a
taxpayer beyond the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act, as in this case, should
never be subjected to the rigorous examination required under the Williams
Packing doctrine.
Since Williams Packing, there have been few cases in which a taxpayer
within the scope of section 7421(a) has been able to overcome its formidable
prohibition and obtain an injunction against the Service.17 7 A notable exception is the case of Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v. Schultz.1 7 8

Plaintiff filed suit when faced with protracted delay over its request for
section 501(c) (3) status, despite compliance with all of the Service's suggestions and the apparent favorable stance of the IRS."79 Shortly thereafter, the
Service ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to section 501(c)(3) status.
The court held to the contrary, however, nullifying the exemption denial on
contested exemptions in this case arose from INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §501(c)(8), which
covers fraternal organizations.
174. ld. at 454, 1972-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,752, quoting Enochs v. Williams Packing &
Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. 9545, at 85,289 (1962).
175. 338 F. Supp. at 453, 1972-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,751 (emphasis added). In this context
the net revenue effect, if any, would be favorable to the Government if plaintiff prevailed. Thus, application of §7421(a) would produce an effect diametrically opposed to the
central purpose of the Act. Loss of tax exempt status would produce tax revenue on the
organization's income.
The court went on to hold that the provision, which grants a tax deduction for
charitable contributions, is a grant of federal financial assistance within the scope of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, as is the exemption provided fraternal orders by §501(c)(8). In contrast, the motion to dismiss was granted as to the nonprofit clubs exempted under §501(c)(7)
because that exemption was limited to member-generated funds. In reaching the issue of
the constitutionality of federal tax benefits to these groups, the court noted: "The minds
and hearts of men may be beyond the purview of this or any other court; perhaps those
who cling to infantile and ultimately self-destructive notions of their racial superiority
cannot be forced to maturity. But the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do require
that such individuals not be given solace in their delusions by the government." Id at
454, 1972-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,752.
176. But see discussion accompanying notes 201-225 infra.
177. Of course, the Green and McGlotten cases are exceptional, because they were aimed
at forcing the Service to withdraw or refrain from granting such status.
178. 368 F. Supp. 863, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 19118 (D.D.C. 1973), appeal dismissed, 9 CCH
1974 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 70,707. The Government had moved to dismiss its appeal. T.I.R.
No. 1277, 9 CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. 6463.
179. The stated purpose of the taxpayer was to "engage in and conduct educational
and charitable activities on a non-profit basis to improve and better the conditions of
American life and institutions by promoting the development of increased responsibility
and awareness on the part of corporate entities and decision-makers to use the corporate
".Id.
at 866, 1974-1 U.S.T.G. at
institution and power to better the social welfare ....
83,047.
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procedural grounds s To buttress its conclusion, the court observed that
even without this nullification plaintiff was entitled to section 501(c)(3)
8
status because it satisfied the operational test for such groups.' '
Although the Center had instituted the action as a refund suit for FICA
taxes, its primary purpose was clearly injunctive relief. Although this question
immersed it in the section 7421(a) quagmire, the district court met the
challenge directly by finding that it had the power to grant the requested
remedy. Because the FICA refund necessitated resolving the tax-exempt
status issue, the court found that the injunctive request would not burden
.the Government with additional litigation, an ancillary purpose of section
7421(a).182 Moreover, because the plaintiff was legally entitled to section
501(c)(8) status, "a suit to prevent collection of those revenues [to which
there is no legal entitlement] cannot be a suit interfering with the collection
84
of legal revenues, as forbidden by the Statute."'1 3 Thus, the central purpose
of the Act was not contravened. Instead of holding that these facts placed
the plaintiff outside section 7421(a), however, the court used them to show
that the Center had satisfied the first Williams Packing requirement- assured
success on the merits.' 85 The second prong was established because, inter alia,
180. Because the Service failed to comply with a discovery order, which was intended
to determine the extent of political influence on the ruling, the court invoked the sanction of FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A), and held plaintiff's allegation of political influence on
the Service's decision established as fact.
181. See text accompanying notes 137-140 supra.
182. 368 F. Supp. at 879, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,058. In Enochs v. Williams Packing &
Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7-8, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. %9545, at 85,289 (1962); the Supreme
Court noted that "a collateral objective of the [Anti-Injunction] Act [is] protection of
the collector from litigation pending a suit for refund."
183. 368 F. Supp. at 879, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,058.
184. In Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7, 1962-2 U.S.T.C.
9545, at 85,289 (1962), the Supreme Court said that the "manifest purpose of §7421(a)"
is to assure the Government of "prompt collection of its lawful revenue." Where the
Government cannot possibly achieve this goal "the central purpose of the Act is inapplicable." (Emphasis added.)
185. In light of its statements, the court's application of the Williams.Packing doctrine
warrants further analysis. As previously indicated (see text accompanying notes 181-184
supra), the court found that the plaintiff was not attempting to do anything forbidden by
the Act. Nevertheless, it proceeded to analyze the situation until it was satisfied that "the
Plaintiff has fully demonstrated that it fits the exception to 26 U.S.C. §7421(a) as specified
in Williams Packing." 368 F. Supp. at 880, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. %9118, at 83,059 (emphasis
.added). The question then becomes: Why did the court require the plaintiff to show that
it satisfied the Williams Packing exception to §7421(a) when it had previously found
that the plaintiff was not attempting to do anything that §7421(a) condemned? The logical
answer is that the court, at least implicitly, viewed the Williams Packing situation as the
only context in which §7421(a) would not bar the action. In other words, the court read
the Williams Packing statement that "[i]f it is clear that under no circumstances could
the government ultimately prevail, the central purpose of the Act is inapplicable," 370
-U.S. at 7, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. g9545, at 85,289, to mean that certain government defeat on
the merits was the only case when the Act would not be applied. This rationale rejects
.the purpose-oriented approach taken in the Gambling Tax cases (see text accompanying
notes 131-132 supra), which would interpret this language in Williams Packing to mean
that whenever the central purpose of §7421(a) is not served the Act should not be applied,
with Williams Packing's factual circumstance being merely one example of such a situation.
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if forced into repeated
the "dirty hands"'186 of
satisfied the Williams
from denying section

In comparing this case to the most recent Supreme Court decisions in

the area,' 87 it is of critical importance to note that the Center was able to
litigate the section 501(c)(3) issue by instituting the action as an FICA refund suit. Once the plaintiff's right to tax-exempt status had been settled
in the FICA controversy, the organization was able to use this determination
to prove that it satisfied the strict, first prong of Williams Packing. Thus, by
raising the question of injunctive relief as a collateral issue in a refund suit,
the Center was able to overcome the section 7421(a) bar. Unfortunately, not
all groups are able to survive the financial strain involved in waiting to
litigate their tax-exempt status in a suit for refund. For less financially solid
organizations, section 7421(a) provides a serious threat to survival. 18
Recent Supreme Court Decisions
On July 10 and July 19, 1970, the Service announced that private schools
following racially discriminatory admissions policies would no longer be
eligible for tax-exempt status, and that gifts to such institutions could no
longer be deducted as charitable contributions.8 9 Upon receipt of an inquiry
letter regarding its admissions practices, Bob Jones University, a fundamentalist institution, replied that its religious beliefs' 90 forbade an open
admissions policy. When negotiations reached an impasse, the University

This rejection of a purpose-oriented approach to the application of §7421(a) appears to
comport with the position taken by the Supreme Court in the Bob Jones case. See text
accompanying notes 204-205 infra.
186. 368 F. Supp. 880, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,058-59. The court pointed principally to
the defendants' refusal to grant the exemption despite the fact that the plaintiff had made
all the changes the Service had specified as necessary to its receipt of §501(c)(3) status.
187. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 94 S. Ct. 2038, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9438 (1973); Alexander
v ."Americans United" Inc., 94 S.Ct. 2053, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9439 (1974).
188. It has been estimated that under optimum conditions there would be a one- to
two-year time lag between a revocation ruling by the Service and adjudication of an
organization's claim of §501(c)(3) status at the district court level. Thrower, I.R.S. Is Considering Far Reaching Changes in Ruling on Exempt Organizations, 34 J. TAx. 168 (1971).
An appeal would add several additional years to the timespan. E.g., Christian Echoes
Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 9129 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973) (final judicial review of a 1966 revocation, litigated in an
F.I.C.A. refund suit, was not concluded until 1973).
189. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 CtJM. BULL. 230. See text accompanying notes 183-184
supra.
190. The school subscribe!; to the doctrine that God intended the various races
of men to live separately, and that intermarriage is contrary to God's will and the
Scriptures. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903, 904-05, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 9185,
at 80,287 (4th Cir. 1973).
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filed suit requesting that the Service be enjoined from revoking its tax-exempt
status.' 91
"Americans United" (AU), an organization dedicated to the separation
of Church and State, had enjoyed section 501(c) (3) status for nearly twenty
years. On April 25, 1969, the Service revoked the ruling on the ground that
a "substantial" part of the organization's activities constituted attempts to
influence legislation.' 92 Although AU's income tax status was not affected
because it was granted a section 501(c)(4) exemption, 193 the ruling caused
94
the organization to be liable for Federal Unemployment (FUTA) taxes.
More significantly, AU was removed from the list of organizations to whom
tax-deductible contributions could be made. 95 Asserting that the 1969 ruling
caused a "substantial decrease in its contributions," AU filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief from the Service's revocation of its section
501(c) (3) status. 96

In both cases the Government moved to dismiss the action on the ground
that the suit was for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection
of a tax, and thus barred by section 7421(a).197 Although both the Fourth
Circuit in Bob Jones University v. Connally and the District of Columbia
Circuit in "Americans United" v. Walters adopted a purpose-oriented approach, they evolved widely differing tests 98 and reached opposite conclusions
as to the applicability of section 7421(a).
191. Id.
192. "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169, 1172, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. t9165,
at 80,216 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
193. INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, §501(c)(4) lists "civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare. . . . the
net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational
purposes" for exemption under §501(a) from income tax liability only.
194. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§3301, 3306(c)(8). As §501(c)(3) organizations are
exempt from social security (FICA) taxes, while §501(c)(4) organizations are not, the shift
in AU's status would, in the ordinary case, result in this additional tax burden. But,
because AU had been voluntarily paying FICA taxes for more than eight years, it was now
incapable of terminating the election even if it had retained its §501(c)(3) status. See
INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, §§3121(b)(8)(B), 3121(k)(1); Alexander v. "Americans United"
Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2053, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. t9439 (1974).
195. In order to qualify as a charitable contribution, deductible under INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, §170(a)(1), INT. RaV. CODE Or 1954, §170(c)(2)(D) requires that a gift be
made to an organization "no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
." Organizations that
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation ....
meet this and the other requirements of §170(c) are listed in the Service's Publication No.
78, "Cumulative List of Organizations Described in Section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954." Because the actions that caused AU's §501(c)(3) status to be revoked also
contravened §170(c)(2)(d), the organization was excluded from the "Cumulative List" as
well.
196. "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 19165 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
197. Bob Jones Univ. v. Conally, 472 F.2d 903, 904, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 9185, at 80,287 (4th
Cir. 1973); "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169, 1177, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 9165,
at 80,217 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
198. The D.C. Circuit limited its inquiry to the effect that the requested relief
would have on the taxes of the organization itself. Although an injunction would cause
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 99 to resolve this conflict between
circuits. In each case the Court denied injunctive relief, holding section
7421(a) applicable. Although separate opinions were handed down, the cases

contributions to be deductible, and thus decrease the tax liability of AU's donors, this
result was held to be "at best a collateral effect of the action, [beyond] the primary
design," and insufficient to trigger §7421(a). 477 F.2d at 1179, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. at 80,221.
Moreover AU was exempt from income taxes by virtue of its §501(c)(4) status, its attack
was placed "in a posture removed from a restraint on assessment or collection." ld.
Therefore, the court refused to hold the action barred by §7421(a).
In its original opinion the Fourth Circuit's approach was considerably less constrained.
That court found that the withdrawal of Jones University's tax exempt status would
subject the organization to tax liability and prohibit donors from taking deductions.
Noting that "[e]ither event would result in an increase in taxes," the court held §7421(a)
applicable. 472 F.2d at 906, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. at 80,288. While these statements clearly imply
that donor-deductibility would be a sufficient reason for invoking §7421(a), the court
seemingly retreated from this position in its opinion denying rehearing. Bob Jones Univ.
v. Connally, 476 F.2d 259, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. %9306 (4th Cir. 1973). There, the court attempted to reconcile its original opinion with "Americans United" by noting that, although
AU would have been exempt from income taxes regardless of the outcome of the litigation,
injunctive relief would have affected Jones University's income tax liability. Id. at 260, 1973-1
U.S.T.C. at 80,650. (This distinction, based on the fact that AU had §501(c)(4) status
while Jones University did not, was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. See text
accompanying notes 219-220 infra.)
The test as originally articulated, however, was accepted and applied by other courts,
in one case notwithstanding knowledge of the Fourth Circuit's seeming retreat. See, e.g.,
Crenshaw County Private School Foundation v. Conally, 474 F.2d 1185, 1973-1 U.S.T.C.
%9287 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S.Ct. 2604 (1974); Peach Bowl, Inc. v. Shultz, 1973-2
U.S.T.C. 19705 (N.D. Ga. 1973). In Crenshaw, a nonprofit, religious private school,
threatened with termination of its tax-exempt status because it would not publicly advertise
a racially nondiscriminatory admissions policy, filed suit requesting that the Service be
enjoined from withdrawing its §501(c)(3) exemption. The institution argued that its
suit was not for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of a tax, because
the administrative acts that it sought to enjoin did not constitute an "assessment or collection" of a tax, and because the purpose of the contested acts was to compel compliance
with the Government's policy of racially integrated education, not to raise revenue.
Stating that it "agree[d] with the Fourth Circuit in Bob Jones University," the court rejected both arguments. The reasons for the Government's action were found to be "irrelevant." With respect to the question of whether the Service's actions constituted an
"assessment or collection" of a tax, the court, citing Bob Jones University, said: "If those
rulings are withdrawn, appellant will be liable for taxes on any net income realized by
it and contributors to it will not be permitted to deduct from their gross income the
amount of their contributions. Either event will result in an increase in taxes. On the
contrary, if the injunction issues, any assessment or collection of such increased taxes will
be prohibited. Section 7421(a) is directed against that result." 474 F.2d 1185, 118, 1973-1
U.S.T.C. 9287, at 80,581-82. The Peach Bowl, Inc. court noted that Bob Jones University
had "impliedly agree[d] that assessment and collection of taxes upon contributors to wouldbe §501(c)(3) organizations was not sufficient to raise the bar of §7421(a)." 1973-2 U.S.T.C.
at 82,284 n.l. But in denying injunctive relief, it declined to follow this logic, opting for
the test as originally articulated in Bob Jones University, because it agreed with the
Crenshaw court. Id.
199. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 414 U.S. 817 (1973); Alexander v. "Americans United"
Inc., 412 U.S. 927 (1973).
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will be analyzed together because the Court's rationale in applying section
200
7421(a) to AU relies and builds upon the Bob Jones decision.
Purpose. The question of "purpose" in this context connotes the coof section 7421(a)
alescence of two similar, but distinct issues: the purpose
and the purpose of the litigation under consideration.
A careful reading of Williams Packing suggests that it can be read to en20 1
dorse a purpose-oriented approach to the application of section 7421(a).
Noting that "[t]he manifest purpose of §7421(a) is to permit the United
States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial intervention," 20 2 the Supreme Court stated that a clear showing of the government's inability to succeed in its claim would make "the central purpose of
the Act ... inapplicable," thus permitting "the attempted collection [to] be
enjoined if equity jurisdiction otherwise exists." 203 In other words, section
7421(a) should not be applied where a denial of injuhictive relief would
204
not serve the central purpose of the statute.
Jones University's attempt to avoid the application of section 7421(a)
reflected this approach. It contended that the Service's actions represented an
attempt to regulate the admissions policies of private universities, rather than
to protect revenue, and thus the case was not one to which the Anti-Injunction
Act was meant to apply. The Court rejected this argument, stating that as
the Service was attempting "to enforce the technical requirements of the tax
lawss... we cannot say that its position.., is unrelated to the protection of
20
the revenues. The Act is therefore applicable." 5
The implications of this conclusion merit further consideration. It must
be remembered that section 7421(a) literally prohibits a suit for the purpose
of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax. It does not prohibit
a suit that seeks to restrain enforcement of a Code provision, nor one that
ultimately results in restraining a tax. Inferring a revenue-protecting purpose
from an attempt to enforce a Code section requires an unarticulated major
premise that the provision is a revenue-raising measure. But such is not the
case with section 501(c)(3) .200 Its purpose, rather, is to "assure the existence
200. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 1974-1 U.S.T.C.

9438 (1974); Alexander

v. "Americans United" Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2053," 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9439 (1974).
201. See Comment, Applicability of Prohibition of Suits To Restrain Assessment and
Collection of Taxes To Revocation of Tax Exemptions Under Section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code, 73 CoLutr. L. R.Ev. 1502, 1510-15 (1973), where the commentator

articulates the dichotomy resulting from a focus on purpose or effect and advocates use
of the test applied by the D.C. Circuit in "Americans United."
202. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 US. 1, 7, 1962-2 U.S.T.C.
%9545, at 85,289 (1962).

203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. Cf. cases discussed in note 14 supra; Comment, supra note 201. The Third
Circuit has noted that "section [7421(a)] presupposes a bona fide attempt of the government to collect revenue." Iannelli v. Long, 487 F.2d 317, 318, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 16,098, at
82,728 (3d Cir. 1973).
205. 94 S. Ct. at 2047, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,069.
206. It is true, of course, that revocation of §501(c)(3) exemption could, in die proper
case, result in a change in net revenue. Therefore, the provision could be used to generate
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of truly philanthropic organizations and the continuation of the important
public benefits they bestow." ' 20 7 Nor can a purpose of tax assessment be
inferred from the factual background giving rise to the Service's action. The
proceedings against Jones University were begun "in accordance with an
announced policy of withdrawing tax-exemption and deductibility-assurance
rulings of schools having racially discriminatory policies. ' ' 20 8 Indeed, the
organization had only to conform its admissions policy to the social goals
expressed in the 1964 Civil Rights Act in order to have its exemption returned.2 0 9 By finding a mere tax nexus sufficient to trigger section 7421(a),
the Court effectively read the word "purpose" out of the Act insofar as the
Government is concerned, and repudiated the purpose-oriented approach to
the Act's application suggested in Williams Packing.25 0 An uncollectible assessment has thus been made the only situation where the Act will be held inapplicable, rather than merely one example of a case where failure to comport with the central purpose of section 7421(a) placed the action outside
the Act.
Both Jones University and AU attempted to persuade the Court that,
regardless of the government's objectives, their own purpose was not to restrain
any tax. Because Jones University would be liable for FICA, FUTA, and
probably income taxes211 if its suit were successful, the Court had no problem
holding that "in any of its implications this case falls within the literal
scope and the purposes of the Act." 212 AU, on the other hand, presented a
more difficult situation. Because the organization also had a section 501(c) (4)
classification, the outcome of the suit would have no effect on its income tax
213
and it
liability. Moreover, AU was already locked into paying FICA taxes,

revenue. At this point, however, we are concerned only with the purpose of the provision
itself, and in the words of Commissioner Alexander "the exempt organization provisions
of the law must be interpreted in light of their special purpose and their place in the
tax law. Their purpose is not to raise revenue." BNA Daily Tax Report, Aug. 30, 1973,

at J-1 (emphasis added).
207. 94 S. Ct. at 2064, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,081 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
208. Bob Jones Univ. v. Conally, 472 F.2d 903, 904, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 9185, at 80,287
(4th Cir. 1973).
209. Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277, 284, 1971-1 U.S.T.C.
(D.S.C. 1971).

210. See text accompanying notes 201-204

9245, at 83,882

supra. Compare the approach

taken

in the Wagering Tax cases (see text accompanying notes 129-132 supra), with the suggested
implication of the Center on Corporate Responsibility rationale. See note 185 supra.
211. In support of its claim of irreparable harm, Bob Jones University alleged that
it would be subject to "substantial" income tax liability if the Service were permitted
to revoke its §501(c)(3) exemption, an allegation that the Court found somewhat difficult

to reconcile with the institution's claim that it was not attempting to restrain the assessment
or collection of a tax. 94 S. Ct. at 2046, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,068. But the Court noted
that "petitioner's assertions that. it will owe federal income taxes should its §501(c)(3)
status be revoked are open to debate, because they are based in part on a failure to take
into account possible deductions for depreciation of plant and equipment." 94 S. Ct. at

2047, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,069.
212. Id.
213. See note 194 supra.
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expressed willingness to pay any FUTA taxes. 214 Therefore, the issuance
of an injunction could have tax consequences only with respect to the
organization's contributors. AU vigorously maintained that such result was
not its purpose. Instead, its primary design was to "avoid the disposition of
contributed funds away from" itself; the removal of tax burdens from contributors was at best a collateral effect. 215 The Court responded by stating that
because the organization's objective could be accomplished only by permitting donors to deduct their contributions, the purpose of the suit was
"216
"to restrain the assessment and collection of taxes ....
Once again the Court's definition of the word "purpose" goes far beyond
the normal characterization. While some element of effect is implicit, the
term is normally limited to the object that one desires to achieve. 217 Here the
Court has included within its meaning all the tax consequences that could
conceivably result. Thus, the Court has done implicitly what it expressly
stated it would not do; it has made the prohibition of section 7421 coextensive with the Declaratory Judgment Act's ban on suits "with respect
218
to Federal Taxes."
Taxes. Having decided that "purpose" includes the consequences of the
action, the Court was next faced with the question of whose tax consequences
were included within the Anti-injunction Act's prohibition against restraint
of "any tax." While granting injunctive relief would have no effect on AU's
tax outlay, it would increase Jones University's assessment. 219 The Court,
214. "Americans United" had begun paying FUTA taxes in 1970. stating that it preferred to continue doing so rather than challenging their imposition via a refund suit.
94 S. Ct. at 2056 n.4, 2059 n.13, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,075 n.4, 84,077 n.13.
215. 94 S. Ct. at 2058-59, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,077.
216. 94 S. Ct. at 2058, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,077.

217. "Purpose" is defined as "[t]he object toward which one strives . . . [a] result
or effect that is intended or desired." TnE AMERuCAN HERITAGE DIGrTONAPY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1062 (W. Norris ed. 1971). Moreover, its distinguishing characteristic
is that it connotes "what one proposes to accomplish . . . in distinction from . . . the
actual or envisioned outcome." Wmrrm's NEw DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS 458 (P. Gove
ed. 1973) (emphasis added).
218. 28 U.S.C. §2201 (1970). See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 94 S. Ct. 2038, 2044 n.7,
1974-1 U.S.T.C. 9438, at 85,066 n.7 (1974); Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 94
S. Ct. 2053, 2057-58 n.10, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. %9439, at 84,076 n.10 (1974). The Supreme Court's

decision, that the scope of the Acts is coextensive, is not unusual. Several courts have
agreed with the D.C. Circuit's statement that although the Declaratory Judgment Act
is "[]iterally broader than §7421(a) in its preclusion of tax oriented remedies, the §2201

[Declaratory Judgment] exception has literally been found coterminus [sic] with that
provided by §7421(a)." "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169, 1176, 1973-1
U.S.T.C. 9165, at 80,219 (D.C. Cir. 1973); accord, e.g., Tomlinson v. Smith, 128 F.2d
808, 1942-2 U.S.T.C. 9540 (7th Cir. 1942); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448,
1972-1 U.S.T.C. 12,827 (D.D.C. 1972). But the Supreme Court's focus is unique. The lower
courts have found the Declaratory Judgment Act to be coterminous with the more restrictive language of §7421(a). In contrast, the Supreme Court's interpretation of §7421
has the effect of making that Act's restrictions conform to the broader language of the
Declaratory Judgment Act.
219. See text accompanying notes 211-215 supra.
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however, found this distinction "irrelevant"; 220 it would not avail AU because "a suit to enjoin the assessment or collection of anyone's taxes triggers
22
the literal terms of section 7421(a)." 1 Consequently, it became necessary to
consider the effect of the litigation on contributors to the organization. It
was contended that granting the requested injunctive relief would not
affect even the donors' tax liability; a fortiori contributors would continue to
achieve tax deductibility, even if the injunction were denied, by merely redirecting their gifts to other exempt organizations. The Court rejected this
' ' 2 22
Therefore, beargument, finding it "too speculative to be persuasive.
cause the contributors' tax liability could be affected by the outcome of the
23
litigation, section 7421(a) applied.2
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun severely reproached the majority for
giving such a sweeping definition to the Act's prohibition. He predicted that
section 7421(a) would become "an absolute bar to any and all injunctions,
irrespective of tax liability, of purpose, or effect of the suit, or of the character
of the Service's action."' 2 1 Moreover, he warned that the combination of
section 7421(a)'s sweeping prohibition of judicial review and section
501(c)(3)'s lack of clear statutory requirements raised grave concerns about
225
possible administrative abuse.
As suggested by Justice Blackmun's statements, the Court's acceptance
of a scintilla of revenue effect as sufficient to trigger the Anti-Injunction
Act's prohibition, without consideration of the magnitude of such effect or
its nexus to a litigant's primary purpose, appears dubious. When the first
revenue effect occurs at the donor level, as in "Americans United," the nexus
to primary purpose is slight indeed. Why should a litigant be denied injunctive relief because of an arguable revenue effect of very low magnitude that
is far removed from his purpose? He did not, after all, bring a class action.
It would seem that a minimum threshold level, beyond which such effect is
de minimis in relation to the "central purpose" of the statute, should be
defined by the judiciary in order to ensure that a litigant who is properly
220. Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2053, 2059 n.13, 1974-1 U.S.T.C.
9439, at 84,077-78 n.13 (1974).
221. 94 S. Ct. at 2058, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,077 (emphasis added).
222. This point was addressed in the Bob Jones opinion. 94 S. Ct. at 2047 n.10,
1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,069 n.10. The court took issue with the premises of the argument
that all donors who take §170(c)(2) deductions will both desert those organizations and
contribute equivalent amounts ioother tax-exempt organizations. See also Note 238 infra.
223. 94 S. Ct. at 2047 n.10, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,069 n.10. In his dissent, Justice
Blackmun questioned the wisdom of such a broad interpretation. Addressing "Americans
United's" assertion that its contributions had "dried up" due to the loss of its favorable
ruling letter, resulting in "contributors [finding] other [tax deductible] objects for their
bounty," he concluded: "When nothing more than possible collateral effect on the revenues
is involved, the Court's wide-ranging test of applicability of §7421(a), announced today,
is, for me, too attenuated and too removed to be encompassed within the intendment
of the statute's phrase, 'for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any
tax.' " 94 S. Ct. at 2062, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,080 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
224. 94 S.Ct. at 2063, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,081.
225. See text accompanying note 180 supra.
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outside the jurisdictional prerequisites to section 7421(a) is not subjected
to its strictures. By declining to recognize that the Williams Packing criteria
are irrelevant in a situation where the revenue effect is so attenuated as to
be secondary to the need for equitable jurisdiction, the Court appears to
226
have eschewed the judicial function.
Procedural Adequacy. Although the District of Columbia Circuit held
that AU's suit was not barred by section 7421(a) because, inter alia, "an alternate legal remedy in the form of adequate refund litigation [was] unavailable," 227 the Supreme Court found that AU was not being foreclosed
from judicial review. An FUTA refund suit would provide an opportunity
to litigate the legality of the Service's withdrawal of its section 501(c)(3)
status. The inability of this remedy to prevent irreparable harm in the form
of lost contributions was inconsequential, because it satisfied only the second
22
prong of the Williams Packing test. 8
While the Court's logic with respect to the availability of a legal remedy
contains a superficial appeal, a careful analysis places its conclusion in doubt.
As implied in both Bob Jones and "Americans Uniied," a finding of some
alternative access to judicial review of disputed section 501(c) (3) status appears
crucial to the application of section 7421(a). 229 In holding that an FUTA
refund suit provides the proper litigatory opportunity, the Court said that
AU's voluntary payment of these taxes "does not alter this conclusion. A
taxpayer cannot render an available review procedure an inadequate remedy
at law by voluntarily foregoing it."230
But is the FUTA action in fact a "review procedure?" That term connotes a method for passing upon the correctness of a decision with respect
to a claim,231 in this case AU's complaint that its section 501(c)(3) status
should not have been revoked. But an FUTA refund suit fails to meet this
definition for two reasons. First, judicial review is not available based solely
on the section 501(c) (3) claim. Rather AU must first raise the issue of its
FUTA liability-an issue it did not want to litigate-before this route becomes available. Therefore, the FUTA refund suit is not a review procedure
for the wrong complained of, but rather for a different action that has its
roots in a common legal and factual issue. Moreover, the remedy addresses
226. See text following note 249 infra.
227. 477 F.2d 1169, 1180, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. f19165, at 80, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
228. 94 S. Ct. at 2059, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,077.
229. In Bob Jones University the Court said: "This is not a case in which an aggrieved
party has no access at all to judicial review. Were that true, our conclusion might well

be different." 94 S. Ct. at 2050, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,071. Similarly, the Court's refutation
of the possibility that "respondent lacks an opportunity to have its claims finally ad-

judicated by a court of law" in "Americans United" implies that such a failing would
otherwise have been fatal. 94 S. Ct. at 2059, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,077.
230. 94 S. Ct. at 2059 n.13, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,077 n.13 (emphasis added).
231. "Review" is defined: "to re-examine judicially," and as a "consideration for
purposes of correction." BLAcK's LAW DIIONARY 1425 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Clearly, the
FUTA refund suit is not for the purpose of correcting the alleged mistake made in
determining AU's §501(c)(3) status. See text following immediately.
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a wrong other than the one with which AU is primarily concerned. It seems
an unwarranted distortion of the term "judicial review" to say that it may
be satisfied by the availability of another, "manufactured" action.
Even assuming that the FUTA refund suit does provide suitable alternative access to judicial review, there is no assurance of its availability. By
deciding to refund the FUTA assessment rather than to litigate, the Service
2 32
can completely eliminate judicial review of the section 501(c)(3) claim..
This conclusion renders curious Justice Powell's statement in the majority
opinion that "this is not a case in which an aggrieved party has no access
at all to judicial review. Were that true, our conclusion might well be
23 3
differen t."
It is worthy of note that the Service's power to moot the litigation is not
limited to the FUTA situation; it extends to all Tax Court and refund
litigation. In the typical case this power presents no problem. Since the
taxpayer is usually concerned with the size of his tax bill, by refusing to
contest the issue the Service provides the relief sought. But when an organization's claim to section 501(c)(3) classification is litigated in a refund suit,
the desired relief (determination of tax-exempt status) is not obtained from
the Service's failure to contest the refund. Thus, by using section 7421(a) in
conjunction with a refusal to contest an assessment, the Service is able to
preclude judicial review of its section 501(c) (3) determinations. Power of
control over the availability of redress in the hands of the one from whom
redress is sought is inconsistent with the term "right," and the existence
of this power renders the present statutory procedure inadequate for claims
23 4

of this sort.

Fairness. In discussing the problems faced by an organization seeking
judicial review of its section 501(c)(3) status, the Court recognized that "these
232. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun said: "There is little doubt that the Commissioner
possesses the authority to make the refund and moot the suit if he chooses not to litigate
the underlying issues." In response to the Commissioner's assertion that such action
would amount to impermissible bad faith, he said that it would be virtually impossible
for the organization to prove bad faith where, as here, "sound administration may not
warrant the time and expense necessary to contest a claim of small amount when vital
issues and conceivably profound precedents are at stake." He also noted the possibility
that the Service might inadvertently concede the refund. 94 S. Ct. at 2067, 1974-1 U.S.T.C.
at 84,084 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, the FUTA Refund Procedure merely changes
the stage at which the Service's decision with respect to an organization's §501(c)(3) status
becomes final, rather than guaranteeing access to judicial review.

233. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 94 S. Ct. 2038, 2050, 1974-1 U.S.T.C.

9438, at 84,071

(1974) (emphasis added).
234. This inadequacy has not gone unnoticed. See generally Worthy, Judicial Determination of Exempt Status: Has the Time Come for a Change of Systems?, 40 J. TAX.

324 (1974). There, the commentator suggests that the jurisdiction of the Tax Court include determination of an organization's exempt status. Noting that "there is now a
precedent for declaratory judgments in exempt organization matters in the Tax Court
in a little noticed provision of the omnibus Pension bill, H.R. 4200," he suggests a similar
provision for §501(c)(3) organizations. Id. at 327. Commissioner Alexander has endorsed
legislation that would provide for such direct appeal. See 40 J. TAx. 273 (1974).
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avenues of review . . . present serious problems of delay during which the
flow of donations to an organization will be impaired and in some cases
perhaps even terminated."23 . 5 It held, however, that forcing the organization
to meet the standards of section 7421(a) and Williams Packing did not
amount to a denial of due process of law "in light of the powerful governmental interests in protecting the administration of the tax system from
premature judicial interference.

' 236

In deciding whether a procedure violates the due process clause, the
extent of the infringement must be weighed against the asserted governmental interest. 237 In terms of the actual revenue involved, a suit aimed
primarily at litigating tax-exempt status, such as AU's, has only a de minimis
revenue effect. 238 Detriments to the taxpayer include the delay inherent in
the judicial process, a time span frequently measured in years. 239 The
typical charitable organization cannot survive such a delay; its very existence
depends upon maintenance of a flow of contributions. Even if the organization
is able to survive the lack of contributions long enough to litigate the issue,
it is faced with additional procedural problems. Refund suits are "geared to
a determination of the technical aspects of [tax] liability and not to the larger
constitutional issues," 240 and the relief granted may be inadequate. 24' More235. 94 S. Ct. at 2051, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,072.
236. Id. (emphasis added).
237. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
238. Assuming AU cannot be forced to withhold its FUTA payments, the only revenue
restrained by an injunction will be that which otherwise would have become due from
contributors to the organization. It would seem that the majority of large contributions
are part of an "intelligent tax plan." That is, they are contingent upon the availability
of a tax deduction. Therefore, the requested relief would have no revenue effect with
respect to these contributions. Such donors would merely reallocate their gifts to other
tax-exempt organizations. See Garrett, supra note 133, at 581-82; Note, The Revenue Code
and a Charity's Politics, 73 YALE L.J. 661 (1964). Thus, the "governmental interest" is
reduced to the minority of donations that come from contributors whose interest in a
specific organization is such that they will make contributions to it regardless of the tax
consequences. There are so many §501(c)(3) organizations with similar goals that a donor
can virtually always find another tax-exempt group that will put his money to the
same use. Thus, the purpose of the organization is not the controlling factor. Rather,
allegiance to the institution is the key. See Garrett, supra note 133. But even these contributions represent an overstatement of the government's interest. Because §170 charitable
contributions are not included in §62 of the Code, they must be deducted from adjusted
gross income and can be taken only in lieu of the standard deduction. See INT. R . CODE
OF 1954, §§62, 63, 141, 170. Therefore, donors in this category who elect the standard
deduction could not take advantage of the tax benefit regardless of its availability. Consequently, the grant of injunctive relief will have tax consequences only for the subcategory of donors who itemize deductions.
239. See note 188 supra.
240. 94 S. Ct. at 2067, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,083. But at least one organization has
successfully used a refund suit as a vehicle for vindicating its claim to §501(c)(3) status. See
discussion of Center on Corporate Responsibility v. Schultz, 368 F. Supp. 863, 1974-1
U.S.T.C. 9,118 (D.D.C. 1973), accompanying notes 178-188 supra.
241. It is not at all clear' that a district court has the power to grant injunctive relief
in a suit for refund. Ini Bob Jones, the Court said: "Petitioner did not bring this case
as a refund action. Accordingly, we have no occasion to decide whether the Service is
correct in asserting that a district court may not issue an injunction in such a suit, but
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over, the organization must contend with the unfettered power that is vested
in the Service.2 42 The availability of section 501(c) (3) status involves:
[S]ocial policy . . . a matter for legislative concern. To the extent

these determinations are reposed in the authority of
Revenue Service, they should have the system of checks
provided by judicial review before an organization['s
is imperiled by an allegedly
unconstitutional change of
2
the part of the Service.

the Internal
and balances
status] . . .
direction on

3

Finally, application of section 7421(a) retards the development of clarifying
case law, 24 4 and the resulting ambiguity surrounding section 501(c)(3)'s ap-

plicable scope tends to inhibit vital innovation, experimentation, and adap4

tation.2 5

In the final analysis, the competing considerations in a due process
analysis are these: the government is interested in protecting revenues obtainable through a percentage tax assessment on contributions made by
those donors who neither follow intelligent tax planning nor take the
standard deduction.2 46 Arrayed against this need are the interests of the
organization and of society. The harm to the organization includes at least
irreparable harm and possibly extinction through the loss of donations,
and the further possibility that procedural problems may produce nonexistent or inadequate relief. The injury to society stems from the abuse
potential inherent in the Service's virtually uncontrolled power over section
501(c) (3) status, and from the "chilling effect" of such power on creative
experimentation by tax-exempt organizations. Simply to state these competing factors is sufficient to compel agreement with Commissioner Thrower's
statement that to prefer the former over the latter "offends my sense of
justice."247

A recurring element of the foregoing analysis has been a sense of distortion of reality. In reaching its decision, the Court defined "purpose" to
is restricted in any tax case to the issuance of money judgments against the United
States." 94 S. Ct. at 2051 n.22, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,072 n.22. Absent such action, it is
questionable whether potential contributors would regard a favorable outcome of such
suit, which carries with it no assurance of future deductibility, as possessing the reliability

of a favorable letter-ruling by the Service.
242. With respect to §7421(a)'s foreclosure of judicial determination of suits for injunctive relief from revocation of §501(c)(3) status, Commissioner Thrower said: "This
is an extremely unfortunate situation for several reasons . . . . [I]n practical effect it
gives a greater finality to I.R.S. decision than we would want or Congress intended."

Thrower, supra note 188, at 168.
243. 94 S. Ct. at 2065, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,082 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
244. Thrower, supra note 188, at 168.
245. See 1965 Treas. Dep't Information Rep. on Private Funds, quoted in "Americans
United," 94 S. Ct. at 2064 n.8, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,081 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

246. See note 238 supra.
247. Thrower, supra note 188, at 168. This statement was quoted in both the Bob
Jones University majority opinion, 94 S. Ct. at 2052 n.23, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,072-73 n.23,
and in Mr. Justice Blackmun's dissent in "Americans United," 94 S, Ct. at 2067 n.14, 1974-1

U.S.T.C. at 84,083 n.14.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

39

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 5
19751

THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT

include any conceivable consequences, and stated that the requisite "tax"
effect will be found whenever anyone's taxes are influenced. An awesome
barrier to injunctive relief has thus been erected, as demonstrated by the
Court's seizure upon an artificial procedure to provide satisfactory alternative
relief. The confluence of these factors produces a result that is difficult to
reconcile with the notion of fairness.
The Court could have avoided many of the objectionable features of its
interpretation by adopting a purpose-oriented approach to the application
of section 7421(a). 248 By limiting application of the Act to factual situations
in which its central purpose is contravened, the terms "purpose" and "tax"
would assume more rational and definite meanings. Particularly, the plaintiff
organization would not be barred by the potential effect that its suit would
have on the taxes of others. Moreover, it would not be necessary to employ
such artificial procedures as FICA and FUTA refund suits as the appropriate forms of relief. Finally, the increased availability of judicial relief would
place a needed restriction on the Service's power in this area.
For Congress to carve out "a specific statutory exception, providing in249
junctive relief for section 501(c)(3) groups, is a process measured in years.
Certainly in the case of AU any revenue effect caused by litigation of its
status was negligible in comparison with the need for judicial review. A
judiciary that is not willing to carry out its role as a "feedback system," correcting power imbalances without the legislative time lag, strains the operational efficiency of a tripartite political system. Due process considerations
are reduced to responses to "average" factual situations. This is inappropriate
in an AU situation where a litigant is effectively barred from access to the
courts by an abrogation of jurisdictional powers in favor of an already powerful administrative agency. A limited judiciary function is not compatible
with the complex problems facing this society in the future.
CONCLUSION

Although section 7421(a) is undeniably useful in situations where the
suit simply delays assessment or collection of taxes, its abuse potential is
extremely high in several areas. The statute has been used in conjunction
with the jeopardy assessment and wagering tax provisions as a fairly effective
harassment tool. The presence of arbitrary assessment appears to be more
than occasional, yet there seems to be no effective restraint:
In the area of exempt organizations, it would appear that public policy
favors a means of obtaining equity relief in contesting revocation of section
248. But the Court rejected the purpose-oriented approach because: "[W]e think our
reading of §74121(a) is compelled by the language and apparent congressional purpose of
this statute." 94 S. Ct. at 2059 n.14, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,078 n.14. By adopting this posture
and interpreting §7421(a) as a broadly based prohibition, the Court apparently truncated
judicial responsiveness to a litigant's plight.
249. For example, there are indications that the breadth of §501(c)(3)'s prohibition
against political activity is the result of an error in draftsmanship. See note 146 supra.
Yet this language remains intact forty years later.
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501(c)(3) status. For example, the political influence in Center on Corporate
Responsibility served to deny section 501(c)(3) status to a group with ideas
and values contrary to those of the current administration, but arguably in
the best interests of many poorly represented segments of the American
public. This result vividly portrays the abuses that can occur when virtually
unfettered power to interpret and enforce social policy is vested in an administrative agency. Certainly, in factual situations like that of "Americans
United," the remoteness of any possible revenue effect and the tenuous nexus
to a litigant's primary purpose indicate that judicial caution should be observed in permitting section 7421(a) to bar injunctive relief. Otherwise, the
Service may be able to rely on section 7421(a) to avoid equity jurisdiction even
though the central purpose of the statute is not being contravened.
Recent Supreme Court. decisions appear to have sounded the death knell
for attempts by the judiciary to delimit the already vast scope of section
7421(a). In fact, under Bob Jones University and "Americans United," it
would appear that the often fatal loss of contributions stemming from revocation of tax-exempt status can never be challenged in the courts at the preliminary stage. Even if the organization manages to survive, its lack of
taxable income would preclude the tax assessment necessary for Tax Court
or refund relief. Alternatively, an FICA or FUTA refund suit, aside from
the lengthy time factor involved, may not allow litigation of the actual issues.
Moreover, it is subject to the whims of the Service, which may moot the
litigation before the section 501(c)(3) issues can be reached. Certainly, one
cannot find any indication that good faith is in overabundance within this
agency250 in light of the arbitrary assessment techniques sometimes employed
in the jeopardy assessment and wagering tax areas.
It appears that legislation is desirable in several areas to provide access
to judicial relief. Specifically, it is suggested that exceptions to section 7421(a)
be codified to permit organizations to contest Service determinations of taxexempt status in a suit for injunctive relief. This would permit litigation
of the section 501(c) (3) issue before the sweeping prohibitions of section
7421(a) could be imposed, thereby alleviating the problem of ineffective
judicial remedies for such groups. 251 Further, within section 501(c)(3) itself,
it is recommended that provision be made for tax-exempt organizations to
devote a specified portion of their activities to direct lobbying. The purpose
of such a provision would be to provide an adversary voice to that of the
business and industrial lobbyists, who can deduct lobbying expenses under
section 162(e).
Because the Supreme Court has interpreted section 7421(a) to preclude
injunctive relief where there is the slightest revenue effect, it seems that the
Court has ignored its function as a flexible corrective body, operational when
250. See Clark v. Campbell, 501 F.2d 108, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 19687 (5th Cir. 1974)
(opinion quoted at note 85 supra); Sherman v. Nash, *** F.2d **, 1974-1 U.S.T.C.
19111 (3d Cir. 1973) (bad faith jeopardy assessment enjoined); Anderson v. Richardson,
354 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Fla. 1973).

251. See note 234 supra.
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